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Abstract 
New standards and initiatives in satellite system architecture are moving the space 
industry to more open and efficient mission operations.  Primarily, these standards allow 
multiple missions to share standard ground and space-based resources to reduce mission 
development and sustainment costs.  With the benefits of these new concepts comes 
added risk associated with threats to the security of our critical space assets in a contested 
space and cyberspace domain.  As one method to mitigate threats to space missions, this 
research develops, implements, and tests the Consolidated Trust Management System 
(CTMS) for satellite flight software. 
The CTMS architecture was developed using design requirements and features of 
Trust Management Systems (TMS) presented in the field of distributed information 
systems.  This research advances the state of the art with the CTMS by refining and 
consolidating existing TMS theory and applying it to satellite systems.  The feasibility 
and performance of this new CTMS architecture is demonstrated with a realistic 
implementation in satellite flight software and testing in an emulated satellite system 
environment.  The system is tested with known threat modeling techniques and a specific 
forgery attack abuse case of satellite telecommanding functions.  The CTMS test results 
show the promise of this technique to enhance security in satellite flight software 
telecommand processing.  With this work, a new class of satellite protection mechanisms 
is established, which addresses the complex security issues facing satellite operations 
today.  This work also fills a critical shortfall in validated security mechanisms for 
implementation in both public and private sector satellite systems. 
 v 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank all of those who provided guidance, camaraderie and support 
during my time at AFIT.  Your dedication and professionalism has enabled my success 
and will serve as a positive impression in my life.  As new horizons dawn, I am fortunate 
to carry the legacy of my time spent at AFIT.  Thank you. 
 
 
      Mark C. Duncan 
 
  
 vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix 
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1 
1.1   Overview ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2   Preview ................................................................................................................. 5 
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................6 
2.1   Introduction ........................................................................................................... 6 
2.2   Satellite Systems Role........................................................................................... 7 
2.3   Satellite Systems Mission Areas ........................................................................... 8 
2.3.1   Remote Sensing. .......................................................................................... 8 
2.3.2   Communications. ......................................................................................... 9 
2.3.3   Precision Navigation and Timing. ............................................................... 9 
2.3.4   Science/Exploration ................................................................................... 10 
2.4   Space Orbits and Environment ........................................................................... 10 
2.4.1   Orbits.......................................................................................................... 11 
2.4.2   Space Environment. ................................................................................... 13 
2.5   Satellite System Components ............................................................................. 15 
2.5.1   Satellite Hardware. ..................................................................................... 15 
2.5.1.1   Telemetry Tracking and Command (TT&C) Subsystem. .................................. 15 
2.5.1.2   Electrical Power System (EPS). ......................................................................... 16 
2.5.1.3   Propulsion subsystem. ........................................................................................ 17 
2.5.1.4   Attitude Determination and Control subsystem (ADACS). ............................... 17 
2.5.1.5   Thermal Control System (TCS). ........................................................................ 18 
2.5.1.6   Payload. .............................................................................................................. 18 
2.5.2   Satellite Flight Software (FSW). ................................................................ 19 
2.5.3   Ground Station Hardware. ......................................................................... 19 
2.5.4   Ground Control Software. .......................................................................... 20 
2.5.5   Telecommanding Architecture. .................................................................. 20 
2.6   Space System Threats and Security .................................................................... 23 
2.6.1   Data Corruption. ........................................................................................ 24 
2.6.2   Interception Of Data. ................................................................................. 25 
2.6.3   Jamming. .................................................................................................... 25 
2.6.4   Masquerade. ............................................................................................... 25 
2.6.5   Replay. ....................................................................................................... 26 
2.6.6   Software Threats. ....................................................................................... 26 
2.6.7   Unauthorized Access. ................................................................................ 26 
2.7   Trust .................................................................................................................... 27 
2.7.1   Trust Management System Examples. ....................................................... 28 
2.7.2   Trust Management System Design Principles. .......................................... 30 
 
 vii 
 
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................34 
3.1   Methodology Overview ...................................................................................... 34 
3.2   Problem Definition.............................................................................................. 34 
3.2.1   Goals and Hypothesis. ............................................................................... 34 
3.2.2   Approach. ................................................................................................... 35 
3.3   Trust Management System ................................................................................. 36 
3.3.1    Services. .................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.2   Architecture. ............................................................................................... 38 
3.3.3   Trust Mechanisms. ..................................................................................... 42 
3.3.3.1   Interaction Trust Mechanism. ............................................................................ 42 
3.3.3.2   Credential Trust Mechanism. ............................................................................. 49 
3.3.4   Policy Evaluation. ...................................................................................... 50 
3.3.5   Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) API. ........................... 51 
3.4   Abuse Case Development ................................................................................... 51 
3.5   System Policy Development ............................................................................... 53 
3.6   Satellite Test Environment .................................................................................. 53 
3.7   Summary ............................................................................................................. 54 
IV. Analysis and Results ....................................................................................................56 
4.1   Chapter Overview ............................................................................................... 56 
4.2   Test Environment Setup ...................................................................................... 57 
4.3   Trust Management System Integration ............................................................... 60 
4.3.1   Interaction-Based Trust Calculation. ......................................................... 61 
4.3.2   Credential Trust Evaluation. ...................................................................... 63 
4.3.3   Trust Data Storage. .................................................................................... 66 
4.3.4   API. ............................................................................................................ 66 
4.4   Implementation Abuse Case ............................................................................... 67 
4.5   Implementation System Policy ........................................................................... 69 
4.6   Experiment Design .............................................................................................. 71 
4.7   Experiment Results ............................................................................................. 72 
4.7.1   System Performance. ....................................................................................... 75 
4.7.2   System Characteristics. .................................................................................... 76 
V. Conclusions and Future Work.......................................................................................78 
5.1   Chapter Overview ............................................................................................... 78 
5.2   Conclusions of Research ..................................................................................... 79 
5.3   Recommendations for Future Research .............................................................. 81 
Appendix A. Simple I-Trust Algorithm Optimization .......................................................83 
Appendix B. Illustrated CTMS Test Sequence ..................................................................98 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................106 
 
 
 
  
 viii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Trust Engine Hierarchy ...................................................................................... 29 
Figure 2 General CTMS Architecture ............................................................................... 41 
Figure 3 Simple Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack ...................................... 46 
Figure 4 Extended Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack ................................... 48 
Figure 5 Test Satellite System .......................................................................................... 57 
Figure 6 Test Environment Setup ..................................................................................... 60 
Figure 7 Authentication Credential Structure ................................................................... 64 
Figure 8 Attempt Approximation Formula ....................................................................... 86 
Figure 9 Beta Bound Pseudo Code ................................................................................... 87 
Figure 10 Number Line for Optimizing α and β Parameters ............................................ 88 
Figure 11 α and β Loop Pseudo Code ............................................................................... 89 
Figure 12 Series of Encounters Pseudo Code ................................................................... 90 
Figure 13 Interaction Series Pseudo Code ........................................................................ 91 
Figure 14 I-Trust Parameter Optimization Tool ............................................................... 92 
Figure 15 Example 1: Initial I-Trust Optimization ........................................................... 93 
Figure 16 Optimization Example 2: No Average Constraint, Min Alpha for Beta .......... 94 
Figure 17 Optimization Example 3: Average Constraint, Minimum Alpha for Beta ....... 96 
Figure 18 Optimization Result Selection .......................................................................... 97 
Figure 19 Step 1, Satellite Diagnostic Port Output ........................................................... 99 
Figure 20 Step 2, Custom Commanding Tool Setup ...................................................... 101 
Figure 21 Step 2, Invalid Command Authentication Count Error .................................. 101 
Figure 22 Step 2, Trust Policy Check During Attack ..................................................... 102 
Figure 23 Secure Unlock Command Transmission ........................................................ 103 
Figure 24 Step 3, Secure Unlock Command Processing ................................................ 104 
Figure 25 Step 4, Legitimate Commanding Following Unlock ...................................... 105 
 
 
  
 ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Simple Interaction Trust Algorithm [43] ............................................................. 44 
Table 2 Extended Interaction Trust Algorithm ................................................................. 47 
Table 3 CTMS I-Trust Marker List .................................................................................. 62 
Table 4 Credential Trust List ............................................................................................ 65 
Table 5 CTMS Member List ............................................................................................. 66 
Table 6 I-Trust Member Evidence List ............................................................................. 66 
Table 7 Abuse case steps .................................................................................................. 68 
Table 8 Implemented Policy Options ............................................................................... 70 
Table 9 Experiment Design .............................................................................................. 72 
Table 10 Experiment Results ............................................................................................ 74 
Table 11 FSW Build Characteristics................................................................................. 77 
Table 12 CTMS Function Performance ............................................................................ 77 
Table 13 Optimization Example 1 .................................................................................... 91 
Table 14 Optimization Example 2 .................................................................................... 94 
Table 15 Optimization Example 3 .................................................................................... 96 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
TRUST MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY IN SATELLITE TELECOMMAND 
PROCESSING 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1   Overview 
This chapter gives a general introduction to the problem domain and provides an 
overview of the thesis research area.  The significance of the problem being addressed 
and motivation for research is also presented in this section.  Additionally, this chapter 
introduces the research goal and presents an overview of the thesis. 
Satellite systems currently influence many aspects of modern society.  From daily 
banking transactions to personal communications to global food production, modern 
society is dependent on the existence of satellite systems.  These systems are launched 
and maintained by both commercial and governmental organizations and consist of 
ground and space-based segments.  The primary entity in the ground segment of a 
satellite system is the satellite control center, or ground station, which commands and 
maintains the operational status of the satellite in orbit.  The space-based segment of a 
satellite system consists of the orbiting satellite or constellation of satellites. Whether 
commercially or government owned and operated, satellite systems of all types have 
made their way into our lives. 
Considering the vital role satellite systems play in modern society, these assets 
can be classified as national critical infrastructure.  As defined in the United States Patriot 
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Act of 2001, critical infrastructure includes "systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters [1]." 
Current public policy in the United States regarding critical infrastructure can be 
tied to Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) "Critical Infrastructure Protection" 
published in May 1998 [2].  The guidance in PDD-63 describes critical infrastructure and 
sets national policy for protecting such infrastructure.  This policy identifies 
responsibilities the Department of Defense (DoD) has for critical infrastructure 
protection, specifically, identifying the need to counter the threat of cyber attacks. 
This added focus on cyber-based attacks stems from the increasing 
interdependence of critical national functions, such as banking, energy, and 
transportation, on advanced technology.  One specific area of technology both supporting 
and serving as critical infrastructure is satellite systems.  While the integration of new 
technology to these areas increases capacity and efficiency, it also makes the 
infrastructure more vulnerable to disruption and attack both physically and through 
cyberspace.  Due to system integration, such an attack has the potential to create 
cascading failures.  Because of the relatively recent progression from disconnected 
systems to complex interconnected systems, this threat is unprecedented, thus justifying 
research into new security mechanisms for critical infrastructure [2]. 
The DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan (CIPP) published in November 1998, 
followed from PDD-63 to address the DoD plan to protect its portion of the nation's 
critical infrastructure.  The DoD portion of national critical infrastructure is divided into 
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sectors, one of which is "Defense Space" [3].  The Defense Space Infrastructure Sector 
detailed in the DoD CIPP consists of both space and ground-based assets.  These include 
launch, specialized logistics, and control systems located worldwide on both DoD and 
commercially controlled sites [3]. 
These national and DoD policies state that satellite systems are currently considered a 
national critical infrastructure and require protection efforts.  These efforts include 
vulnerability assessment and mitigation methods.  This reality motivates research to 
identify potential vulnerabilities in satellite systems and to develop methods to mitigate 
associated risks. 
To begin addressing security in satellite systems, this research considers common 
threats to space missions as presented in satellite security publications.  The Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has published several reports concerning 
threats and security protocols relating to satellite systems [4,5,6].  A specific and the most 
significant threat discussed in these and related works involve the satellite command link, 
also known as the telecommand system.  This threat is further categorized in this work.  
Furthermore, a specific forgery attack generally referred to as an abuse case is developed 
to illustrate satellite command link security issues. 
Telecommand is a common term in the space industry referring to command and 
control communications through a wireless command link used to control satellites in 
orbit.  According to the CCSDS report, Telecommand: Summary of Concept and Service, 
a telecommand system conveys control information from an originating source to a 
remotely located physical device or process [7].  In satellite systems, the controlled 
device is primarily a satellite bus, payload, or process aboard a spacecraft.  The term 
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telecommand used in this document refers to communications which initiate, modify, or 
terminate certain functions of a satellite [8].   
Traditional space mission telecommand systems consist of centralized, mission-
specific architecture [7].  These systems have unique components, data formats, and 
procedures for each space mission.  This focus on mission unique technology and 
telecommand architecture is changing.  The most significant of these changes are the 
development and implementation of open standards for spacecraft control.  The primary 
motivation for the implementation of these standards is to reduce costs and satisfy cross 
support activities for satellite systems [5].  With the application of a general open 
telecommanding architecture, greater focus must be placed on satellite command link 
security. 
Traditionally, logical security in satellite systems has not been a primary concern.  
Focus on system development in the space domain has primarily been on safe 
functionality rather than system security from malicious intent.  The predominate reason 
for this is the critical fault intolerant nature of operating in space.  The improper 
configuration of software onboard a satellite can leave a multimillion dollar space system 
useless, thus discouraging security features [9].  Another factor influencing this basic 
functional versus security focus is the threat profile in the space domain. 
In the past, satellite systems were off limits to individuals and many organizations 
due to complexity and cost of entry.  With the reduction of cost and the introduction of 
system standards, satellite system technology is now more widely available than ever [5].  
In an effort to remedy the current Flight Software (FSW) security situation resulting from 
these factors, this work addresses the application of security features for satellite system 
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commanding.  The new features considered in this work utilize the concepts of trust 
management from the distributed information systems domain. 
 
1.2   Preview 
In summary, safety and security in satellite system commanding operations are in 
jeopardy given the increased access to the space domain, lack of space system security 
focus, and an increasing trend in global cyber threats [6,10].  It is proposed that satellite 
system safety and security can be improved with a proven trust management architecture 
which addresses common cyber threats to space assets.  The focus of this research is to 
develop an efficient and effective method of applying interaction trust via a Trust 
Management System (TMS) to satellite system commanding for enhanced mission safety 
and security. 
Chapter II presents a review of related literature that introduces the satellite system 
domain in detail along with security and trust management principles.  Chapter III details 
the proposed TMS for satellite telecommanding incorporating multiple trust mechanisms 
and introduces abuse case methodology for evaluating the system.  Chapter IV presents 
the experiment setup used for testing FSW and the developed TMS with a forgery attack 
abuse case.  Chapter IV also covers results of the TMS testing and performance 
characteristics of the TMS.  Chapter V provides an analysis of the results with 
recommendations for further research in the field. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of literature, concepts and existing work relevant to the 
development of a trust-based security model for satellite systems.  First,  a review of the 
space domain as it relates to satellite systems is presented, covering the roles, missions, 
operating environment, and components of satellite systems.  Second, literature related to 
satellite system threats is introduced.  Third, security principles and threats which apply 
to satellite and computer systems are reviewed.  Finally, the concept of trust, as it relates 
to distributed information systems and trust related work is presented.  
This thesis focuses on threat detection and mitigation in satellite system 
telecommanding operations through the application of a Trust Management System 
(TMS) to satellite Flight Software (FSW).  Most threats to spacecraft telecommand links 
are a result of  their Radio Frequency (RF) transmissions being broadcast through an 
open medium [5,6].  To understand the threats and risks to satellite telecommanding 
systems an investigation of existing work which classifies threats to satellite systems is 
performed.  To form a response to these threats, concepts of computer and satellite 
security are reviewed.  Principals of trust management in distributed information systems 
and other fields are also examined to support this thesis.  Concepts from relevant trust 
research are utilized to realize the primary goal of this work, to develop and apply a new 
satellite security mechanism utilizing trust management theory.  This effort requires a 
general understanding of space system missions, space environment, and system 
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components.  These principles of satellite systems lay the foundation for common 
satellite operations upon which system security can be evaluated. 
 
2.2   Satellite Systems Role 
Satellite systems influence many aspects of modern society.  From daily banking 
transactions to personal communications to global food production, our society is 
dependent on the existence and operation of satellite systems. 
Not only do many commercial industries rely on the use of satellite resources to 
conduct daily operations, government entities have also grown similarly dependent on 
satellite systems [11,12].  The U.S. DoD currently utilizes many types of satellite systems 
and has contributed to the advancement of satellite systems in general.  Official policies 
of the U.S. government emphasize the critical nature of these systems to the prosperity of 
the nation and call for the protection of these systems [13,12,14]. 
Traditionally, satellite systems operating in the public and private sectors have been 
large-scale and highly proprietary in nature.  With more than 50 years since the launch of 
the first satellite, much has changed in the way of satellite systems and the computer 
components vital to their operation.  Satellite system components are now becoming 
more standard across missions along with the integration of mission operations with 
internet technology.  This changing culture in satellite system development and 
operations will increase efficiency but also provide new security challenges [6].  One 
example of this phenomenon is illustrated by the CubeSat standard and its various 
derivative projects.  This new trend in satellite systems does not only apply to small 
satellites, however applies to all of the mission areas for satellite systems. 
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2.3   Satellite Systems Mission Areas 
The missions of satellite systems can be categorized into four main areas: Remote 
Sensing; Communications; Precision Navigation and Timing; and Science/Exploration 
[15].  One key aspect of satellite systems is that the primary mission will determine in 
which orbit the satellite will operate [11,16,17,15], see Section 2.4.1.  The following 
sections examine the characteristics of each mission area.  
2.3.1   Remote Sensing. 
The primary mission of remote sensing satellite systems is to observe the Earth and 
other objects from orbit.  Satellites in orbit provide a unique observation platform from 
which to view the Earth.  Remote sensing satellites utilize Radio Detection and Ranging 
(RADAR), optical, and other sensors to collect images and measurements. These systems 
can also detect Infrared (IR) and other emanations from Earth. 
Optical observation is used to produce images of the Earth’s surface which can be 
analyzed to provide valuable information.  This information aids military operations and 
intelligence, as well as documentation of urban development, scientific research, and 
predictions of crop yields for global food supply planning [18].  Additionally, IR sensors 
aboard military satellites are used to provide missile launch and nuclear detonation 
detection [19].  One of the earliest benefits of space systems was the prediction and 
analysis of Earth's weather patterns.  Optical and IR sensors are used to observe visible 
weather phenomena as well as collect atmospheric measurements for weather forecasting 
[20].  These satellites are even used to monitor space weather, see Section 2.4.2. 
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2.3.2   Communications. 
Communication satellites revolutionized the way humans communicate.  A satellites 
unique field of view makes it an ideal communications relay platform.  Satellite 
communications (SATCOM) links have been used to provide intercontinental 
communications for major telecommunications providers since the mid 1960s [16]. 
Large corporations use SATCOM to link together many geographically separated 
organizational units into one network in order to facilitate logistics and enhance daily 
operations [11]. SATCOM is also extensively used by military forces to conduct 
operations around the globe. 
2.3.3   Precision Navigation and Timing. 
The United States government pioneered the development of precision navigation and 
timing satellite constellations beginning with the TRANSIT satellite constellation in 1960 
and culminating with the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) which became 
operational in 1993 [15].  NAVSTAR GPS satellites, along with ground control and 
monitoring stations, provide accurate three-dimensional locations and timing for use in 
civilian and military operations worldwide.  After the introduction of GPS for 
government use, the tremendous commercial implications for the GPS signal have led to 
its widespread civilian use and eventual dependence. 
Examples of private sector and individual use of GPS include banking, transportation 
and communications.  The banking and global financial markets now rely on GPS timing 
to synchronize transaction systems.  Individuals routinely use GPS signal for navigation 
assistance.  Finally, as the wireless telephone market developed with the freely available 
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timing provided by GPS, these systems are now dependent on this method of time 
synchronization [21]. 
2.3.4   Science/Exploration 
Satellites orbiting with science/exploration missions continue to advance technology 
used in satellite systems and contribute to many diverse fields of science.  Such missions 
have led to advancements in Earth and materials science, as well as astronomy.  These 
science/exploration missions provide immeasurable value to the human understanding 
and way of life through invaluable advancements and discoveries [22]. 
Examples of these space related technologies being transferred to two diverse areas of 
our daily lives are advancements in medical imaging and the development of cordless 
tools.  The medical imaging technology advancement stems from the charged coupled 
devices (CCDs) used aboard the Hubble space telescope which convert light directly into 
digital images.  These devices are now used to image the human body and differentiate 
between benign and cancerous tissues.  Additionally, technology developed to recover 
lunar samples was directly transferred to domestic use as battery powered power tools 
and appliances [23]. 
 
2.4   Space Orbits and Environment 
Operating in space presents many challenges to the success of satellite systems.  In 
order to conduct a successful satellite mission, considerations must be made with regard to 
a satellites orbit, and the space environment.  The space environment consists of extreme 
temperatures and pressure, along with multiple forms of radiation.  Additionally, these 
environmental factors are impacted by the orbit at which a satellite is operating [17]. 
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2.4.1   Orbits. 
A satellite’s primary mission will dictate the orbit in which the satellite will be 
placed.  The orbit placement in turn will determine when and how long a ground station 
has a satellite within field of view, and how much transmission power is required for 
communications between the satellite and ground stations.  Orbit placement also 
influences satellite power considerations, stability, and attitude control options [15].  
There are two satellite orbit shapes: circular and elliptical.  For both orbital shapes, the 
center of the Earth is in the plane of the orbit with an inclination taken between the 
orbital and equatorial plane.  Circular orbits are further subcategorized by altitude: Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and geosynchronous orbits [16,15,24]. 
LEO satellites operate with an altitude up to 1500 km and are primarily used for 
remote sensing and science missions, with some communication applications being made 
with advanced cross linking satellite platforms [15].  The communication satellites 
operating in LEO are primarily used to provide global mobile telephone service.  
Advantages and disadvantages for LEO satellites are used to determine the orbits 
suitability for a particular satellite mission.  The advantages of LEO are [17,15]: 
- reduced cost to place payloads in orbit 
- reduced communication transmission power requirements 
- simplified satellite attitude control 
- lower latency for communications 
- higher resolution for remote sensing applications 
 
Some disadvantages for LEO orbits are [17,15]: 
 
-short ground station access periods 
- high satellite velocities complicate communications 
- short orbital lifespan due to increased drag at lower altitudes 
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MEO satellites operate at an altitude of around 20,000 km, which is well outside the 
Earth’s atmosphere.  The increased altitude relative to LEO gives MEO satellites a 
broader view of the Earth, making them more suitable for applications requiring more 
global coverage.  MEO class orbits can be semi-synchronous with the Earth’s rotation 
with a satellite making two revolutions around the Earth in one day.  These orbits are 
most suitable to modern precision navigation and timing applications such as NAVSTAR 
GPS [15]. 
Geosynchronous satellites operate at an altitude of 35,780 km and have the special 
property of orbiting the Earth once every 24 hours [15].  This allows the spacecraft to 
remain in a semi-fixed position relative to a specific ground station.  Geosynchronous 
satellites will have some perturbation in location relative to a fixed spot on Earth, which 
may require ground stations communicating with them to track this slight movement.  
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) is a geosynchronous orbit which has an inclination of 
exactly zero degrees.  GEO satellites will remain over the same fixed spot on Earth with 
proper station keeping [15]. 
GEO and geosynchronous satellites are ideal for communication missions where the 
satellite remains fixed in the sky and can reliably relay communications between two 
ground stations within the satellites field of view.  Each geosynchronous satellite has a 
field of view of approximately one half of the Earth.  Global communications, with 
exception of the high latitudes, are achievable with a three satellite constellation [15]. 
Elliptical orbits have unique properties which can be useful for communication 
missions to high latitude areas.  These orbits fill the gaps in coverage left by GEO 
satellites, which at best reach latitudes of 81 degrees.  One specific type of elliptical orbit 
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which can be used to simulate a stationary satellite in GEO is the Molniya orbit.  These 
elliptical orbits with high eccentricity and an inclination of 63.4 degrees provide long 
dwell times over a location on Earth.  A constellation of three Molniya satellites are 
required to provide continuous service to a single ground location [15]. 
2.4.2   Space Environment. 
The space environment consists of a vacuum with varying levels of cosmic and solar 
radiation.  Satellites in orbit do not have the full protection from radiation provided by the 
Earth's magnetosphere.  This leaves satellites vulnerable to space weather conditions 
which has a detrimental effect on critical systems even when protection mechanisms are 
in place [17]. 
Space weather consists of magnetic fields, charged particles, and radiation.  The 
dominant factor in space weather is solar wind from the sun consisting of charged 
particles and radiation bursts.  The effects of solar winds vary over time, as their strength 
fluctuates and as they impact Earth's magnetic field.  Highly charged particles in the 
space environment, from solar wind, often disrupt electronics aboard satellites [17]. 
The most common occurrence of electronic disruption or failure aboard satellites is 
the Single Event Upset (SEU).  A SEU occurs when an ion or electro-magnetic radiation 
interferes with an electronic circuit in such a way that information stored in the circuit as 
bits are corrupted.  This action often results in a failure of the satellite's onboard 
computer logic.  These errors are generally not fatal for the spacecraft and normal 
operation is typically resumed after resetting the system [25].  Certain orbits and areas in 
space are more prone to these types of events.  One commonly known area in which 
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satellites experience an increased likelihood of a SEU is called the South Atlantic 
Anomaly (SAA). 
The SAA is an area over Brazil and the south Atlantic ocean where space borne 
radiation comes closer to the Earth than any other place.  This area is caused by a dip in 
the Earth's magnetic field allowing cosmic rays and charged particles to reach lower 
altitudes.  Satellites crossing this area are exposed to higher levels of radiation, which 
results in the increased chance of a SEU [26]. 
These unpredictable, disruptive events have an impact on system design.  As a result, 
engineers have designed systems with failsafe defaults and recovery modes which in turn 
increase mission safety.  These actions lead to systems which are more mission safe and 
in some cases increases system complexity. 
Mission safety is a concept in which the satellite system is robust to failure and the 
likelihood of satellite operators losing control due to human error or space weather is 
reduced.  The disadvantage of a sole focus on mission safety is that systems may be more 
vulnerable to malicious actions, resulting in reduced system security.  Though the 
concepts of mission safety and system security appear to be competing design principals, 
a balance between the two must be achieved which serves the overall requirements for 
the mission. 
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2.5   Satellite System Components 
The components of satellite systems are generally similar, however, the mission 
determines which components are found in each system.  Components are organized by 
their location in the system, which is divided into three categories: ground segment, space 
segment, and subscriber segment.  Not all satellite systems require all segments of the 
general satellite system [16]. 
The satellite system can be broken down and described  by functional areas consisting 
of major components.  The exact configuration of these functional areas are influenced by 
and provide support to the system's primary mission.  The satellite system functional 
areas described here are Satellite Hardware, Satellite Software (programmed logic), 
Ground Station Hardware, Ground Station Software (programmed logic), and 
Telecommand Architecture [16,15]. 
2.5.1   Satellite Hardware. 
The orbiting hardware, or satellite, typically contains the following subsystems: 
Telemetry Tracking and Command Subsystem (TT&C), Electrical Power System (EPS), 
Propulsion System, Attitude Determination and Control System (ADACS), and Thermal 
Control System (TCS).  These subsystems constitute the satellite main bus.  The main bus 
is constructed to support the primary payload.  The following subsections will describe 
the functions of the main bus subsystems and the payload integration [16,15]. 
2.5.1.1   Telemetry Tracking and Command (TT&C) Subsystem. 
The TT&C subsystem hardware consists of a flight computer, radio, and antenna for 
communicating with a controlling ground station.  The TT&C subsystem provides 
satellite status data (telemetry) along with functions to command the satellite and control 
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the other subsystems.  The TT&C subsystem is also used to provide a tracking and 
ranging service to the ground station.  Tracking and ranging data is used to accurately 
point high gain antennas towards the satellite and to provide accurate orbit determination 
for the satellite's mission [16,15].   
Commands from ground stations are received by the TT&C subsystem and command 
specific actions are executed.  These commands can be intended for the TT&C subsystem 
itself or for any of the other subsystems.  Additionally, status information from all of the 
satellite subsystems is collected and formatted for transmission as satellite telemetry to 
listening ground stations. 
2.5.1.2   Electrical Power System (EPS). 
The spacecraft's payload and satellite support systems (bus) require power provided 
by the EPS to operate.  The EPS manages power generation, storage, and distribution 
throughout the spacecraft.  These actions are done in conjunction with the logic present in 
the satellite's flight computer.  The power subsystem hardware consists of an EPS 
controller, power source, and batteries [16]. 
The distribution of a spacecraft's power is managed by the EPS controller.  The EPS 
controller continuously monitors and adjusts connections to the power sources and the 
charge/discharge rates of the onboard batteries.  Additionally, the EPS controller switches 
power to each of the spacecraft bus systems and payload as necessary, while reporting 
power status information to the flight computer [27]. 
The primary power source for most satellites is photovoltaic solar cell arrays.  The 
power output of a solar array is proportional to the angle of incidence of solar rays on the 
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panel.  If the panel is misaligned with the Sun’s radiation such that the angle of incidence 
is zero, then no power will be produced [16]. 
Most satellites will periodically encounter eclipse periods in which no direct sunlight 
reaches the spacecraft.  The frequency and duration of these eclipse periods are 
determined by the orbit of the satellite.  During these periods, the orbiting spacecraft must 
rely on a power source other than solar.  Battery systems fill the gaps in power supply for 
satellites during eclipse periods [15]. 
Satellite commands which orient a satellites solar cell arrays or configure the EPS for 
power distribution are critical to the successful operation of a satellite.  Any malicious or 
otherwise improper processing of commands which modify the satellites power 
configuration has the potential to leave the satellite crippled or otherwise inoperative.  
This is one example of where specific satellite telecommands present a potential 
vulnerability to satellite systems. 
2.5.1.3   Propulsion subsystem. 
Most long term satellites require propulsion systems to make changes to their 
trajectory after being placed into orbit.  These trajectory changes may be significant or 
minor.  Significant changes in orbit are generally made during the initial phase of a 
satellites operation to reach the desired mission orbit.  Once the mission orbit is 
established, an onboard propulsion system is needed to maintain the orbit [15]. 
2.5.1.4   Attitude Determination and Control subsystem (ADACS). 
The ADACS in a spacecraft is used to maintain sensor and antenna orientation for 
pointing.  The ADACS is composed of control logic, sensors, and mechanical systems for 
adjusting the attitude of the satellite.  The control logic for the ADACS is maintained by 
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the spacecraft flight computer or by a secondary microcontroller.  The ADACS can be 
dynamically adjusted via the satellite command link.  There are many sensors and 
techniques for satellite attitude determination, including star tracking, sun tracking, IR 
Earth sensing, and RF tracking [15]. 
With accurate spacecraft attitude information, the flight computer can make 
adjustments in position with the attitude control systems.  These systems are used to 
accurately point sensors at a desired location or place the spacecraft in a desired 
orientation [15].  Any failure or malicious activity disrupting the operation of these 
systems could result in total loss of the satellite. 
2.5.1.5   Thermal Control System (TCS). 
Space is extreme with respect to temperature.  External satellite components can 
experience temperatures ranging from -200 to +150 degrees Celsius [15].  These 
temperature extremes drive the development of spacecraft thermal control systems.  Two 
methods of thermal control are passive design techniques and active thermal control 
systems.  Passive design techniques rely on material conduction and radiation properties.  
Active thermal control systems include electric heaters and radiators which must be 
operated as conditions change on the satellite.  A satellite's thermal design is critical to its 
successful operation.  Thermal systems are monitored by telemetry sent through the 
command link.  Adjustments to active components of the thermal control system can be 
made via specific thermal control commands [15]. 
2.5.1.6   Payload. 
The main system payload will correspond to the satellite's mission.  The payload can 
consist of sensors, communication devices, or scientific equipment.  The deployment and 
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control of the payload is facilitated by the flight computer and command system with 
support from the other bus systems for power, pointing, and thermal management [15]. 
2.5.2   Satellite Flight Software (FSW). 
The satellite FSW running on the main flight computer is a critical component of the 
satellite and manages all aspects of the satellite hardware (TT&C, EPS, Propulsion, 
ADACS, TCS, Payload) [28].  Portions of the FSW must be specifically tailored to each 
function of the spacecraft bus.  Some of the spacecraft management can be automated to 
handle faults as they occur and alleviate the need for intervention by the commanding 
ground station. 
2.5.3   Ground Station Hardware. 
Satellite systems are managed by ground stations which send control information to 
the orbiting satellite in the form of discrete commands.  These control messages are 
commands, which specifically address each of the satellite subsystems previously 
mentioned (TT&C, EPS, Propulsion, ADACS, TCS, Payload).  Additionally, the ground 
station receives satellite telemetry of the satellite's status [16]. 
A typical satellite ground station has three main components: RF Interface, Signal 
Processing, Mission Execution.  The RF Interface is composed of the antenna, low noise 
amplifier, power amplifier, signal down converter and signal up converter.  The Signal 
Processing component consists of a transceiver, Terminal Node Controller (TNC), and 
modem.  The mission execution segment typically consists of command terminals 
operating ground control software and integrates the mission specific processing 
components with the other ground station components.  Satellite systems may utilize 
multiple ground stations for redundancy purposes [16]. 
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2.5.4   Ground Control Software. 
Ground control software facilitates the commanding of satellites within a satellite 
system.  The software runs on computers at the ground station or on remote systems 
which connect via networks to the ground station.  The function of ground control 
software is to transmit commands to the satellite, receive and interpret telemetry data 
passed back from the satellite, and pass updates to the satellite software [16]. 
The design and implementation of ground control software is driven by mission 
requirements.  The architecture of ground control software can be divided into two 
sections: common ground control components and mission unique components.  The 
common ground control components are not mission specific and can be used with 
multiple satellite systems.  An example of software which has been developed to serve 
the function of common ground control components is the Common Ground Architecture 
(CGA) command software.  CGA is ground control software with a large percentage of 
the architecture consisting of reusable ground control code.  This modular design allows 
CGA to support multiple satellite missions with the same core components and mission 
specific applications.  Each satellite system CGA supports has specially designed mission 
unique components [29]. 
2.5.5   Telecommanding Architecture. 
Satellite system telecommanding architecture will differ by implementation, however 
some key concepts are presented as features contributing to the safety and security of 
satellite commanding in general.  Additionally, some examples of satellite 
telecommanding architecture are covered to illustrate the concept and highlight areas 
where trust management concepts may be applied. 
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The telecommanding architecture and implementation play a crucial role in the safety 
and security of a satellite system due to the open nature of communications between 
ground stations and satellites.  Critical vulnerabilities in the telecommanding architecture 
implementation can allow events, whether malicious, accidental, or environmental, to 
disrupt or destroy a satellite [6].  The following features have been seen in satellite 
telecommanding architectures and are similar to concepts found in distributed 
information systems: 
 Satellite addressing is implemented in a telecommanding architecture to direct 
commands to a specific satellite or decoder.  This feature affords some 
protection from commands being erroneously processed by the wrong satellite 
or satellite subsystem [15]. 
 Command register verification confirms commands to be processed aboard a 
satellite by transmitting the command queue to the ground station for 
acknowledgment before execution [15]. 
 Encryption is used to provide the security service of confidentiality to the 
telecommanding architecture.  It can be implemented in many levels of the 
architecture resulting in varying impacts on system performance, complexity, 
reliability, and security [5,30]. 
 Command counters in the telecommanding architecture provide an element of 
security and safety to the system.  The command counter assigns a unique 
number to each command being transmitted to the satellite.  Command 
counters are  primarily implemented to ensure commands are executed at most 
once and in the proper order.  If commands are processed out of order or in 
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duplicate, the system could become unstable resulting in mission degradation 
or loss of the satellite [15]. 
 Authenticated commands in the telecommand architecture is implemented by 
checking the command counter or through more complex cryptographic 
mechanisms [15].  The use of a command counter for command authentication 
provides command execution safety, where cryptographic user authentication 
enables system security. 
 The use of time stamps in telecommanding architecture involves assigning a 
time stamp to each telecommand message.  The time stamp is used by the 
satellite to verify the sequence of commands being received.  Time stamps 
feature is also useful in detecting the replay of a command [15]. 
The following are examples of how the telecommand architecture can be 
implemented in a satellite system: 
The command execution of a satellite as described by Patton [15] is typically a two-
step process.  First, the satellite operator selects a command which is formatted by the 
ground control software and equipment for transmission to the satellite.  This command 
formatting appends a preamble to the transmitted command.  The preamble contains an 
address key which identifies the particular satellite for which the command is intended.  
This specific address key provides protection against stray signals being received and 
executed by the satellites TT&C subsystem.  Once the TT&C subsystem receives a 
command from the ground station with the proper address, the contents of the command 
register (current command to execute) are transmitted to the ground station for 
verification.  If the command is successfully validated by the ground station, the 
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transmission is acknowledged by transmission back to the satellite, at which time the 
command is executed.  It should be noted that the commanding procedures for satellite 
systems can vary greatly between systems of differing size, complexity, and purpose 
[15]. 
The command execution sequence for the satellite system used as a model in this 
research is a derivative of CubeSat FSW and concept of operations.  In this model, 
commands are formatted at the ground station with the ground control software CGA.  
CGA interprets human readable commands and builds a data stream which is then 
transmitted to the satellite.  The data stream transmitted to the satellite contains ground 
station and space station ID numbers. These are used to confirm that the command is 
originating from a valid ground station ID and is directed to the proper satellite interface.  
The command data stream also contains a message protocol and command identifier 
which are used to determine the satellites response to the command.  As a safety feature, 
a command authentication count is included in the message header.  The command 
authentication count is used in conjunction with most commands and verifies the satellite 
and ground station is in sync during the commanding process.  Command arguments 
(parameters) are marshaled after the authentication count.  CGA computes a checksum 
over the command header and arguments, and appends it to the end of the command data 
stream.  The checksum ensures data integrity during the command transmission [29,31]. 
 
2.6   Space System Threats and Security 
This section describes space system threats and corresponding security mechanisms.  
However, this treatment of space system threats is not exhaustive, but is provided to serve 
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as a broad overview and background for the development of scenarios to aide in the 
testing of new security features for satellite telecommanding.  Information regarding 
possible threats to space missions is necessary for mission planners to better understand 
the security mechanisms and policies required to mitigate them.  All systems are subject 
to threats which may result in the loss of data or catastrophic damage to the system [6]. 
A threat is a potential violation of security.  The occurrence of a violation is not 
necessary for a threat to be present.  An attack refers to activity related to the violation of 
security.  In order for a successful attack to take place, the system must be vulnerable to 
the threat in action.  The existence of a possible violation of security requires actions to 
be taken which guard against threatening activity and mitigate system vulnerabilities 
[32]. 
The following sub-sections serve as an overview of the most common threats to space 
missions.  This information highlights the findings presented in the CCSDS report 
Security Threats Against Space Missions [6]. 
2.6.1   Data Corruption. 
Data corruption occurs as the result of a fault in either the ground or space segment of 
a satellite system or by the intentional or unintentional action of an individual.  This 
corruption event may take place in the hardware or software of the satellite system's 
components.  Common faults include hardware failures or a SEU in the spacecraft.  The 
effects of data corruption can range from an unnoticed anomaly in telemetry data to 
catastrophic loss of the spacecraft due to the processing of a corrupt command [6]. 
 
 
 25 
 
2.6.2   Interception Of Data. 
Data communications with spacecraft are achieved via RF signals which are subject 
to interception.  The extent to which this threat applies to a space mission is dependent 
upon the orbit in which the space segment of the system is operating. LEO missions are 
less susceptible due to the short access period and small beam width of the downlink 
signal.  Conversely, missions operating in high orbits such as GEO have large downlink 
beams and long access periods and therefore increased susceptibility to interception.  
Transmissions from ground stations are typically less susceptible to interception due to 
the highly directional antennas and small beam widths used to communicate with 
satellites.  Signals may be intercepted by listening ground stations and by signal 
intelligence gathering aircraft or spacecraft [6].  
2.6.3   Jamming. 
Persistent RF interference is characterized as jamming.  The RF signals used for 
communications with spacecraft are susceptible to interference.  Interfering signals can 
be intentional or unintentional and can result in link loss or denial of communications 
with the satellite.  This interference is accomplished by transmitting a competing signal 
on the same frequency the satellite is operating.  Interference can originate from a ground 
station or from a third party satellite orbiting within line of site of the mission ground and 
primary satellite [6]. 
2.6.4   Masquerade. 
Entities in a satellite system must interact with others remotely.  These interactions 
may require identification prior to each requested action.  If an entity can lie about its 
identity, or identification is not accurately validated, entities can illegitimately pose as 
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one another in the system.  If an entity in the system poses as any other entity it is said to 
be masquerading.  The masquerading entity can violate security policies by taking 
unauthorized actions [6]. 
2.6.5   Replay. 
There exists the possibility of a re-transmission of commands to the space segment of 
a satellite system.  This replay of a specific command can occur due to a commanding 
protocol or by a malicious third party attempting to gain access or cause damage to a 
satellite.  A ground station protocol resulting in the replay of a command may be the 
result of a previous command not properly acknowledged by the satellite, thereby 
prompting the re-transmission of the assumed lost command.  The effects of a satellite 
erroneously processing duplicate commands can range from none to catastrophic loss of 
the satellite due to a duplicate orbit maneuver or breach of satellite security [6]. 
2.6.6   Software Threats. 
Computer software plays a crucial role in the operation of a satellite system in both 
the space and ground segments.  This software is susceptible to logic errors, data input 
handling errors, among other common programming mistakes.  Additionally, operators 
may introduce improper configurations, resulting in security vulnerabilities or system 
instability [6]. 
2.6.7   Unauthorized Access. 
Policies set forth in the operation of a space mission determine which entities should 
have access to specific systems and functions.  Entities accessing systems or functions 
which violate these policies constitute unauthorized access in the system [6].  Entities 
may gain unauthorized access to the satellite system through a combination of other 
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threats to the system.  The abuse case presented in Section 4.4 is an example of 
unauthorized satellite access through a forgery attack.  This attack also incorporates 
elements of the other threats discussed such as data replay and masquerading. 
 
2.7   Trust 
The issue of trust has become a significant concern within distributed information 
system architectures such as web services, cooperative computing, and mobile computing 
[33,34].  Trust issues are not only present in business, social and operational functions, 
but also in technologies used to facilitate these activities.  Additionally, due to the tight 
coupling between a systems operational requirements and the technology used in 
implementation, trust relationships from the operational architecture must be modeled in 
the distributed information system.  Specific distributed information systems must 
address all of the trust issues present in the operational scenario and those that arise in the 
technical implementation [33]. 
One example of modeling operational trust relationships in a distributed system 
implementation can be made for satellite system telecommanding.  The operational 
function of telecommanding inherently involves a trust relationship between the satellite 
in orbit and a commanding ground station.  The satellite in orbit must process 
telecommands from the ground station in a manner which preserves the functionality and 
security of the satellite.  This trust relationship in the operational function of 
telecommanding must be modeled in the satellites implementation in order to satisfy the 
operational trust relationship. 
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2.7.1   Trust Management System Examples. 
Research covering trust management in distributed computing has developed services 
and applications which accommodate trust and its related elements.  Some elements 
which have been addressed thoroughly are reputation, and security credentials.  Examples 
of reputation-based systems include XREP, NICE, and P-Grid.  These systems aggregate 
the perception of entities in the system to calculate a local reputation value for a specific 
entity.  This reputation value is then used in system policy to manage interactions with 
entities in the system.  Credential-based systems such as X.509, PGP, PolicyMaker, and 
KeyNote use credentials to address the trust management problem.  The primary 
evidence for trust in these credential-based systems is the verification of entity provided 
credentials.  These systems enable policies which restrict access to services and resources 
to verified entities. [35] 
While both reputation and credential-based trust management approaches address the 
issue of trust in distributed information systems, neither provides a general description of 
a trust management system, nor incorporate all of the desirable features found in current 
trust management research.  A comprehensive description of a general trust management 
system is found in the works of Weiliang Zhao, Vijay Varadharajan, and George Brian 
[36,37,38,35].  These papers develop a general methodology for modeling trust 
relationships and provide a unified framework for trust management.  The unified 
framework developed incorporates aspects of trust management from a variety of related 
research [35]. 
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Figure 1 Trust Engine Hierarchy 
 
The basic TMS presented by Zhao et al., referred to as TrustEngine, manages trust 
through the hierarchy depicted in Figure 1.  This architecture incorporates all of the trust 
related components which may be separated from applications and handles trust requests 
similar to database queries.  Input is made to the system as a set containing trustor, 
trustee, conditions, and trustee properties.  The system will return a value depending on 
the input received.  An example response is the result of a trust relationship  
evaluation [35]. 
TrustEngine consists of several components which serve trust functions or store trust 
data for the system.  The TrustDatabase component stores trust relationship information 
and trust parameters.  This is a persistent storage mechanism for extended storage and 
retrieval of trust related information.  TrustControl provides overall control of 
TrustEngine at runtime by linking applications to the functional packages in TrustEngine.  
LocatingTrust performs a direct query of existing trust information from the 
TrustDatabase component.   
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The EvaluatingTrust component evaluates the current status of a trust relationship.  
This evaluation consists of checking whether the conditions of a trust relationship are 
satisfied or not.  These conditions may be indicators of malicious behavior or 
environmental factors, and can be computed by multiple trust mechanisms.  Existing 
mechanisms for checking trust conditions such as credential, reputation, or environment 
evaluation may be incorporated into the EvaluatuingTrust component.  
ConsumingTrust handles the EvaluatingTrust component output.  This is necessary as 
not all trust evaluations will be consumed immediately.  Additionally, the evaluation 
output may require specific formatting for use by the requesting application which is 
handled by the ConsumingTrust component.  
2.7.2   Trust Management System Design Principles. 
The following is a discussion of trust management concepts as it relates to distributed 
information systems put in the context of satellite telecommanding.  Trust has become an 
intrinsic part of other distributed information technology areas such as e-Business [33], 
and critical infrastructure protection [39].  The nature of satellite telecommanding studied 
here closely resembles the definition of a distributed information system utilizing the 
client-server model [40].  With this relationship, models for trust management and design 
principles in distributed information systems will be applied to telecommanding (message 
passing) for satellite systems. 
Weiliang Zhao and Vijay Varadharajan presented a unified trust management 
framework which introduced general characteristics for consideration in TMS 
development [33].  These TMS characteristics as they relate to satellite systems are: 
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 Multiple Trust Mechanisms: 
Trust can be established between entities by various methods.  These methods are 
modeled in the TMS with specific trust mechanisms.  Examples of trust mechanisms 
are credential verification trust, reputation-based trust, and trust derived from local 
data.  TMSs can incorporate multiple trust mechanisms in concert for a single trust 
decision regarding a complex trust relationship [33].  Without multiple trust 
mechanisms, a TMS is limited to modeling simple relationships.  These simple 
relationships are commonly handled by an authentication protocol or other security 
mechanism. 
 Open Nature: 
Satellite telecommand systems are open to all wireless transmissions, allowing 
everyone to access the satellite's physical channel remotely.  As the system is open, 
trust relationships must be defined for known and unknown entities accessing the 
system.  The open nature of wireless telecommand links makes trust management a 
crucial part of the entire system [33]. 
 Multiple Domains: 
Operations involving satellite telecommanding often span several networks with 
organizational, physical, and logical boundaries.  The interconnection of these 
networks can be hierarchical or parallel.  For example, a satellite control network is 
used to command a single satellite.  The satellite control network consists of 
command terminals which are remotely located from the uplink facility transmitting 
signals to the satellite.  The remote command terminals access the uplink facility 
through a terrestrial communications network.  In this case, there is a hierarchical 
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relationship between the remote command terminal and uplink facility sending 
signals to the satellite.  There is a parallel relationship between multiple ground 
transmission sites.  Trust relationships can be complex in the entire telecommanding 
system.  Issues can arise in cross-boundary operations, management, and 
administration [33]. 
 Real-Time Trust: 
For most distributed information systems, real time evaluations are required for 
trust relationships. This is also true for satellite telecommanding systems.  The 
dynamic trust relationships in satellite telecommanding require a real time evaluation 
of trust in any TMS being applied.  In order to facilitate this real time trust evaluation, 
evidence used to calculate trust must be collected and made immediately available for 
a trust determination.  An analysis of the relevant time frame for this trust evaluation 
must be conducted to ensure a "current" trust result is being used when necessary [33]. 
 Scalability: 
Each distributed system has a scale at which it operates.  A TMS implementation 
must be able to scale to meet the maximum requirements of the distributed system.  
The scale involved with traditional satellite commanding architectures is relatively 
small compared to web-based distributed systems [33]. 
 Complexity: 
Complexity in modern distributed information systems is increased by 
complicated business functions and advanced technology employed in the 
architecture of such systems.  TMSs introduced to or developed in these systems must 
be capable of matching and modeling the complex trust relationships involved [33]. 
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The above items describe key areas which should be considered for trust management 
in distributed information systems.  These characteristics are evaluated in this work for 
the development and implementation of a TMS for satellite telecommanding. 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1   Methodology Overview 
This thesis addresses threats to the security of satellite command links through the 
development of a multi-mechanism Trust Management System (TMS) for satellite Flight 
Software (FSW).  The previous chapter discusses the basic domain of satellite systems, 
general trust management, and computer security concepts.  This chapter covers the 
development of a TMS incorporating interaction, policy and credential-based trust.  
Additionally, a satellite commanding abuse case is formulated to test the TMS.  The 
developed TMS and formulated abuse case will then be applied to a FSW model where 
comparison is made between a FSW operating with and without the TMS.  This chapter 
presents the motivation for, and explanation of key design features of the Consolidated 
Trust Management System (CTMS), a multi-mechanism TMS for application in satellite 
FSW.  The definitions and assumptions associated with the CTMS, FSW model, and 
abuse case are also presented. 
 
3.2   Problem Definition 
3.2.1   Goals and Hypothesis. 
The work presented by Zhao and Varadharajan [33] detailing a unified trust 
management framework provides a high-level architecture, considerations, and theory 
from which a TMS is developed.  Additionally, the documentation related to the KeyNote 
TMS [41] [42] provides an excellent example of implementing a TMS, although it is 
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limited to credential and policy evaluation.  With the framework provided by Zhao and 
Varadharajan and the implementation lessons from the KeyNote documentation, a new 
TMS is developed to handle the complex trust requirements in satellite FSW. 
This new TMS will be referred to as the Consolidated Trust Management System 
(CTMS), and incorporates multiple trust mechanisms and policies.  It is hypothesized that 
the CTMS will enhance security in FSW telecommanding by allowing the detection of 
anomalous behavior from the FSW's perspective.  The goal is to determine if the CTMS 
running within the FSW can detect the activities of a malicious ground station and 
respond with a pre-programmed policy and trust thresholds. 
3.2.2   Approach. 
To design an effective TMS for FSW telecommanding that will detect anomalous 
behavior, the multiple trust mechanism TMS framework proposed by Zhao and 
Varadharajan will be implemented with an architecture similar to that of the KeyNote 
TMS [33,41,42].  Additionally, the method for calculation of an Interaction Trust  
(I-Trust) value as proposed by Bin Yu and Munindar Singh will be adapted to provide a 
quantitative measure of I-Trust for entities in the system [43].  The I-Trust algorithm 
from Yu and Singh is extended to provide a more descriptive measure of I-Trust by 
basing the trust value calculation on a specific marker associated with system 
interactions, see Section 3.3.3.1.  This I-Trust value is used as a component in the final 
trust evaluation of an entity, see Section 3.3.4. The I-Trust calculation and management 
of I-Trust values will exist as a trust mechanism within the CTMS, see Section 3.3.2. 
An I-Trust marker is a class of evidence in the system which is collected by observing 
interactions with an entity.  One example of a trust marker in FSW is the command 
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authentication counter check result.  Each command contains a value for the command 
counter which is compared with the satellites onboard value upon receipt.  This check is 
the authentication counter trust marker and is modified based upon cooperation or 
defection interactions with the system.  Additional markers can be associated with a 
single transaction, such as message size, or argument validation checks. 
With the CTMS developed, a satellite commanding abuse case is formulated as a 
basis to generate policies and identify interaction markers for tracking within the system.  
The abuse case is a specific instance of a threat action or attack scenario applied to the 
satellite FSW system.  An analysis of space mission threats is combined with a working 
FSW model to formulate specific abuse case for the system, see Section 3.4 and 4.4. 
With an abuse case and CTMS complete, a test setup is established which runs FSW 
in an emulated environment.  The test setup includes original ground station software for 
normal commanding operations and custom ground station software to apply the abuse 
case.  From the test setup, comparisons are made between FSW with trust management 
principles applied and basic FSW with no trust management.  Additionally, variations on 
policy options within the CTMS are compared to highlight their effectiveness and impact 
on the system. 
 
3.3   Trust Management System 
3.3.1    Services. 
The CTMS serves as an engine for tracking and evaluating complex trust 
relationships in satellite FSW.  The functionality of the CTMS is used as a security 
mechanism to support the three computer security services of confidentiality, integrity, 
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and availability [32].  With a given system security policy, the CTMS acting as a security 
mechanism can be implemented to prevent, detect, or recover from attacks waged on the 
system [32].  This allows CMTS to monitor and support the three computer security 
services. 
The CTMS architecture supports the confidentiality of a system by monitoring 
interactions secured through cryptographic means for activity which would be indicative 
of a key compromise.  An example of such activity would be repetitive failures to 
successfully validate the command authentication counter.  This activity could simply be 
logged for detection, or further compromise could be prevented by discontinuing use of 
the potentially compromised key.  Furthermore, the CTMS architecture can be used to 
initiate telemetry notification of the event using a secure backup key. 
System integrity is supported by monitoring interactions with ground stations and 
components aboard the spacecraft for potentially corrupt data.  The corrupt data could be 
improperly formatted messages or erroneous telemetry values. The CTMS architecture 
could  be used to detect or prevent this activity.  Additionally, recovery features can be 
initiated through the CTMS.  Logging the activity being monitored provides detection 
services.  Further corruption can be prevented by discontinuing use of the corrupted data.  
Additionally, system integrity could be recovered by rebuilding corrupt data from a valid 
checksum. 
CTMS functions can also secure satellite system availability by maintaining trust 
relationships between the FSW and components in the untrusted environment.  If these 
trust relationships are degraded, the FSW can fall back to a safe state, thus preserving 
system availability for recovery operations.  This functionality, provided by the trust 
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management system, stems from and can be extended through the addition of trust 
mechanisms within the CTMS architecture. 
3.3.2   Architecture. 
The CTMS architecture and implementation are primarily derived from the KeyNote 
TMS documentation [44], while the concept of multiple trust mechanisms and additional 
trust management theory stems from Zhao and Varadharajan's trust management 
framework [33].  The development of the CTMS architecture considers the major 
characteristics for trust management systems from Zhao and Varadharajan [33] as they 
relate to the trust issues for satellite FSW. 
The first characteristic included in CTMS is multiple trust mechanisms.  The trust 
mechanisms incorporated initially into the CTMS architecture for this work are the  
I-Trust and credential trust mechanisms.  Additionally, the CTMS architecture is flexible 
with the provision for additional trust mechanisms to be added as needed. 
The second characteristic considered for the CTMS is to address the open nature of 
telecommanding in satellite systems.  Illegitimate ground stations can broadcast signals 
or commands to an orbiting satellite.  This open nature influences the development of a 
TMS architecture for satellite FSW and illustrates the need for TMS monitoring of open 
interactions. 
Authentication mechanisms within the system can be used to filter known from 
unknown user communications, but only after some processing of the transmission is 
performed.  Some FSW systems may not include authentication mechanisms [31].  The 
CTMS addresses unauthenticated communications with a trust pool for unregistered users 
and handles commands attributed to these entities as anonymous.  Without a mechanism 
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for authenticating users, to isolate them from the anonymous trust pool, policies cannot 
be implemented which discriminate between entities.  This issue is addressed with the 
credential mechanism in the CTMS architecture. 
The third major characteristic of the CTMS is the availability of real-time trust 
evaluations.  Trust relationships in FSW are continuously changing.  An example of the 
dynamic trust relationships in satellite systems is demonstrated with the satellite 
command link.  Messages received through the command link are validated based upon 
system parameters resulting in trust evidence from the interaction.  This evidence can 
indicate a potentially legitimate (cooperation) or malicious (defection) interaction with an 
entity.  The resulting trust relationship must reflect an entity's cooperation or defection 
behavior. 
The CTMS architecture provides the capability to dynamically evaluate interactions 
based upon markers in the system.  These markers are specific characteristics of the 
interaction, such as a valid command authentication count.  The I-Trust value for an 
entity is computed in real-time during interactions and is immediately available as TMS 
data.  The policy evaluation function then uses this TMS data to compute entity trust 
relationships and return a policy compliance status. 
The fourth trust management characteristic considered is that of scalability.  Within 
satellite FSW, the TMS scale is limited by the resources onboard the satellite and the 
number of external entities involved in operations.  The CTMS architecture can scale to 
accommodate varying types and numbers of entities paired with multiple trust 
mechanisms and policies.  For example, all ground stations expected to communicate 
with the satellite can be added to the credential and I-Trust mechanisms.  Trust data can 
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then be computed individually for each ground station with proper authentication.  
Additionally, satellite local entities (onboard components) can each be added as members 
in CTMS by establishing an authentication procedure and tracking an I-Trust value for 
each identifiable component of interactions with them. 
Lastly, the complexity of satellite systems is considered in the CTMS architecture.  
The complexity inherent in satellite systems through the incorporation of multiple 
advanced technologies influences trust relationships.  As the satellite FSW integrates all 
spacecraft functions it serves as a mission critical subsystem and hub for processing and 
evaluating the trust relationships in the spacecraft.  The complexities found in satellite 
systems trust relationships, embodied in the FSW, can be modeled with CTMS 
components due to its modular design. 
From the KeyNote TMS implementation, all TMS functions are contained within the 
KeyNote Interpreter.  This consolidation of trust management functions allows the TMS 
to be implemented with minimal complication to the overall software system.  Similarly, 
the CTMS functions are implemented outside of the FSW application code.  Trust 
management operations are accessed with simple function calls to the CTMS.  As 
requests arrive to applications within the FSW, these applications will make updates to 
trust mechanisms as necessary to maintain trust evidence in the system.  Before 
applications process potentially hazardous external requests, a trust determination is 
requested from the CTMS based upon a selected policy. 
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All of the considerations for design and implementation details as discussed can be 
seen in the general CTMS architecture Figure 2.  The general CTMS architecture shows 
the integration of  trust management modules with the satellite FSW.  Additionally, 
interactions between the entities and components in the system are shown. 
The primary function of the CTMS is to provide policy evaluations based upon trust 
evidence within the FSW .  The components which provide this capability are the 
Interaction Trust Mechanism, Credential Trust Mechanism, Policy Evaluation Function, 
and CTMS Application Programming Interface (API). 
 
 
Figure 2 General CTMS Architecture 
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3.3.3   Trust Mechanisms. 
The CTMS architecture is flexible and can employ many trust mechanisms.  The 
incorporation of additional trust mechanisms to the CTMS allows more complex trust 
relationships to be evaluated by system policies.  Much like the I-Trust mechanism 
monitors the behavior of entities in the system based upon interaction markers; additional 
trust mechanisms can be used to determine how entities should be trusted in the system.  
One example is an environmental trust mechanism.  Environmental parameters can be 
evaluated against a standard in real-time with the results being evaluated by system 
policy.  Policy defines which entities should be trusted in the system and what actions 
should be taken considering trust evidence in the system. 
3.3.3.1   Interaction Trust Mechanism. 
The I-Trust mechanism consists of functions which calculate and maintain I-Trust 
values for entities communicating with the FSW.  Each entity being tracked by CTMS 
can have multiple trust markers associated with it.  A separate I-Trust value is calculated 
for each marker associated with an entity.  These I-Trust values are later used to make 
policy determinations in the system. 
I-Trust markers are defined as key indicators in the system either inherent to the FSW 
or specifically added to characterize entity interactions.  As previously indicated, an 
example I-Trust marker is the command authentication count field in a command 
message.  If a message authentication count field does not correspond to the current value 
held in the satellites state, it is considered invalid and indicates the receipt of a potentially 
malicious command.  Other examples of inherent I-Trust markers include command 
arguments, command time stamps, and the overall command format. 
 43 
 
An example of an I-Trust marker added to the system specifically for the purpose of 
trust calculation is a consecutive command failure counter.  This counter would be 
checked against a maximum threshold and an I-Trust value would be calculated based 
upon this marker.  System policies can then make references to the I-Trust value 
computed based upon the consecutive command failure marker.  An example policy 
using this marker is to generate an alert log entry with the date and time of the failed 
attempts.  This log would be reviewed by satellite controllers for further investigation. 
The I-Trust value calculation algorithm used in the I-Trust mechanism is largely 
based upon the work of Yu and Singh in the field of reputation management in electronic 
communities (social interaction) [43].  The I-Trust value presented here is applied to the 
communications in FSW and calculates an I-Trust value based upon a series of 
interactions.  The resulting trust value is then compared with a policy limit on trust 
regarding the monitored marker (this limit is set for each marker in a trust policy).  The 
result of an I-Trust value check is a trust rating for the marker, which contributes to the 
entity's overall trust rating. This marker trust rating is considered in an active system 
policy which determines how the system will react to low trust interactions.  
To achieve the previously described trust-based policy enforcement, an I-Trust value 
is defined. 
DEFINITION 1: jxT is the trust value assigned by the I-Trust mechanism to entity j 
for interaction marker x.  It is required that -1 < jxT < 1 and jxT  is initialized to zero. 
 
The I-Trust mechanism calculates a trust value for entity j based upon its observation 
of interactions involving entity j affecting marker x.  Cooperation is an instance of system 
interaction in which the trust marker in question is positively affected; meaning the 
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marker indicates legitimate activity.  A cooperation interaction by entity j results in a net 
increase of the trust value with the factor α, while defection reduces the trust value with 
the factor β.  The positive and negative associations for α and β require α ≥ 0 and β ≤ 0.  
The specific magnitudes of α and β are determined by the nature of the interactions 
taking place which modify the trust marker.  Typically, trust relationships are such that 
trust is hard to gain and easy to lose.  This results in the relationship |α| < |β|.  The values 
of α and β can be either static or dynamic depending on the nature of the environment to 
which the trust system is being applied [43].  Further detail regarding the selection of 
suitable α and β values for the command authentication count I-Trust marker is presented 
in Chapter IV. 
DEFINITION 2: After an interaction, the resultant trust value 'jxT  is calculated by 
the algorithm presented in Table 1 which considers the previous trust value jxT . 
 
Table 1 Simple Interaction Trust Algorithm [43] 
jxT  Cooperation interaction by j Defection interaction by j 
< 0 ' (1 )jx jx jxT T T    ' 1 min( , )
jx
jx
jx
T
T
T


   
> 0 '
1 min( , )
jx
jx
jx
T
T
T


   
' (1 )jx jx jxT T T    
= 0     
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Table 1 presents the algorithm for computing interaction trust, which will be referred 
to as the simple I-Trust algorithm.  Following the work of Abari and White, the simple 
interaction trust algorithm was tested against a confidence attack [45].  This initial testing 
was performed to gain an understanding of the simple interaction trust algorithm and to 
characterize it's performance under a specific attack scenario. 
A confidence attack, or con man attack is a sequence of interactions where an entity 
conducts a series of consecutive cooperation interactions to elevate an associated trust 
rating in the system.  These cooperation interactions are followed by a single defection 
interaction, which would result in a benefit to the con man (malicious) entity.  This 
defection interaction also lowers the system trust value for the con man.  The attackers 
intended result of this activity is the systems continued processing of defection 
interactions resulting in a net benefit to the attacker. 
An initial analysis of the simple trust value calculation was performed by simulating a 
number of cooperation and defection interactions with entity j.  These interaction 
sequences were based upon the concept of a con man attack where entity j interacts 
cooperatively Θ times before a single defection.  This Simple Con man Attack (SCA(Θ)) 
pattern was repeated for 250 individual interactions with a graph of the calculated trust 
values shown in Figure 3 [45]. 
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Figure 3 Simple Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack 
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This characteristic of the simple interaction trust algorithm to maintain a steady 
positive trust value with a known number of defection interactions is important to 
modeling certain trust relationships.  In particular, this method is used to model trust 
relationships between a satellite and ground stations based upon the command 
authentication count marker.  This is due to the nature of satellite telecommanding where 
legitimate ground stations may have a number of defection interactions during a 
telecommanding encounter. 
To make the system of trust value calculation resistant to potential confidence attacks, 
values of α and β may be dynamically adjusted based upon entity interaction and the 
current trust value.  This method follows work presented by Abari and White [45]. 
The initial value for α is preserved as α0 during the entire series of interactions by the 
I-Trust mechanism.  The algorithm for α and β determination to achieve a con-resistant 
trust value calculation is shown in Table 2.  The algorithm described in Definition 3 
along with the trust calculation in Table 1 and Table 2 will be referred to as the extended 
I-Trust algorithm. 
DEFINITION 3:  α and β are determined for con-resistant trust value calculation by 
the algorithm in Table 2, where C is a constant 0 < C ≤ 1: 
Table 2 Extended Interaction Trust Algorithm 
Cooperation interaction by j Defection interaction by j 
0 0min( ( ), )c        (1 )(1 )d
  
   
 
    
1c    d jxC T    
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Figure 4 is a plot containing the basic test results of the extended I-Trust algorithm 
during a confidence attack.  The interaction patterns used in this initial evaluation of the 
extended I-Trust algorithm are the same as those used for the simple I-Trust algorithm 
shown in Figure 3.  Figure 4 shows the I-Trust values are more severely impacted by 
defection activity and none of the interaction patterns converge to a high trust value.  The 
extended interaction trust algorithm may be suitable for interactions which provide 
benefit to malicious entities for repeated abuse. 
 
 
Figure 4 Extended Trust Value Graph During Confidence Attack 
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For the I-Trust mechanism, the I-Trust value corresponding to each marker tracked 
for entities in the system is initialized to zero.  The I-Trust value alone may not provide 
enough information determine how an entity will be trusted by the system.  This value is 
simply an indicator of one entity’s behavior based upon evidence concerning a specific 
trust marker.  How the I-Trust value will be interpreted is up to the system policy 
utilizing the value, see Section 3.3.4.  
Applications within the FSW call upon to the I-Trust Mechanism to update trust 
evidence based on system interactions.  Once an interaction has been sent to the I-Trust 
mechanism, system policy can be evaluated based upon the current system status.  FSW 
applications use the result of the system policy evaluation to process interactions. 
The system policy making use of I-Trust values defines a threshold for acceptance.  
The threat being addressed by any policy must be characterized and resulting parameters 
required for I-Trust calculation must be established by the developer.  To properly 
identify the threat, the I-Trust calculation must fit within the threat model and accepted 
use of the system.  Chapter IV and Appendix A provides additional discussion relating to 
system characterization and policy determination to mitigate threats to satellite systems 
with the CTMS architecture. 
3.3.3.2   Credential Trust Mechanism. 
The credential trust mechanism processes authentication credentials to provide 
cryptographic authentication within the FSW.  The use of cryptographic authentication 
identifies entities with a high degree of assurance. The credential trust mechanism can be 
implemented with any one or a number of different authentication protocols.  The 
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CCSDS has recommended the HMAC authentication algorithm SHA-1 as a standard for 
message authentication in satellite systems [30]. 
Some satellite FSW does not have authentication services included in system  
code [31].  Authentication services can be integrated into FSW with a robust TMS 
architecture or dedicated authentication service.  A dedicated authentication service 
would require developers to implement an authentication protocol and integrate its 
functionality into the FSW.  The credential trust mechanism in the CTMS architecture 
provides entity authentication for the FSW through standard function calls.  This 
mechanism will receive a credential provided by an entity and determines if the 
credential is valid thereby identifying the entity.  With user (entity) authentication 
available to the FSW, policies can be implemented which consider the authentication 
status of entities interacting with the system.  This authentication is critical to the 
performance of security related protection functions with CTMS architecture. 
3.3.4   Policy Evaluation. 
The CTMS serves as a security mechanism by evaluating the systems security policy.  
These evaluations are performed by the policy evaluation function in the CTMS 
architecture.  This function requires the system security policy to be stated in quantifiable 
terms which can then be evaluated for compliance.  Additionally, the policy evaluation 
function must have access to the objects and variables referenced in the system security 
policy. 
The policies evaluated can model complex trust relationships making full use of all 
trust mechanisms and trust evidence collected in the system.  The result returned from the 
policy evaluation function is used in the FSW application as the final trust rating for the 
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entity in question.  The policy evaluation function gives FSW applications a mechanism 
for enforcing system security policies. 
3.3.5   Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) API. 
In order for FSW applications to make use of the trust management system, the 
CTMS Application Programming Interface (API) must be incorporated into application 
code.  The CTMS API consists of function specifications which are used to update trust 
evidence information in trust mechanisms, gather information from trust mechanisms, 
and request policy evaluations.  The API also specifies where CTMS functions should be 
placed in application code to perform the desired trust management activity.  With the 
applications making use of the CTMS API, trust evidence and policy evaluations may be 
processed in the FSW. 
 
3.4   Abuse Case Development 
The specification of an abuse case describes a complete and detailed set of 
interactions that result in actual harm to the system.  A maximal abuse case has been 
characterized as gaining complete control of the system through an abuse of privileges.  
The maximal abuse is not always necessary to characterize an abuse of the system.  
Simple abuses minimally compromise the privilege necessary to accomplish an intended 
harm on the system [46]. 
Within an abuse case, actors are described by their characteristics.  The critical 
characteristics necessary for modeling an actor in an abuse case include the actors 
resources, skills, and objectives [46].  For this work, actors in the satellite 
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telecommanding abuse case must be modeled with characteristics relevant to the satellite 
systems domain. 
The purpose of an abuse case is to describe a family of undesirable interactions with 
the goal of reducing security requirement oversights and design flaws.  The abuse case 
definition includes many abstract transactions which may be used to accomplish a single 
abuse of the system [46].  Specific features or components in a system which may be 
exploited are selected and included in the abuse cases description. 
The concept for a satellite commanding abuse case is derived from the CCSDS report 
concerning threats to space systems and known computer system intrusion techniques [6].  
Additionally, related research on telecommanding security refers to a specific attack case 
for satellite commanding communications. 
The related attack case involves a malicious entity attempting unauthorized access to 
a satellite command link through a forgery attack.  This forgery attack requires an 
attacker to possess knowledge about the spacecrafts orbital and physical channel access 
parameters.  Additionally, the attacker is modeled to have access to the command 
message structure, and can transmit modified messages to the satellite [47]. 
The steps of the referenced forgery attack begin with the attacker intercepting 
legitimate satellite command messages.  These messages are then analyzed for the 
underlying protocols.  Once identified, fields in the message relating to satellite access 
are modified in a manner which will allow the attacker to successfully command the 
satellite [47]. 
The objective of the attacker in the previous scenario is to gain control of the satellite.  
It is this activity that this thesis serves to address with the CTMS architecture.  Further 
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discussion regarding the specific forgery attack satellite telecommanding abuse case used 
in this work is presented in Chapter IV. 
 
3.5   System Policy Development 
The system policy used in this research will be based upon the abuse case activities 
being tested in the system.  Through this relationship, system policy plays a critical part 
in addressing security in the satellite system.  One of the primary benefits of CTMS is to 
provide mechanisms with which to implement system policy.  For example, the CTMS 
interaction trust mechanism will allow system policies to be implemented which take into 
consideration a users interactions.  Additionally, the system policies used for testing are 
designed to demonstrate the logging, detection, and prevention of malicious activities 
utilizing the CTMS. 
 
3.6   Satellite Test Environment 
A functional satellite system is required to support implementation of the CTMS 
architecture to satisfy the goal of this thesis.  The final implementation and associated 
testing demonstrates the feasibility of the CTMS architecture.  This testing is also 
performed to demonstrate the use of a CTMS implementation to support satellite system 
security.  The necessary components for constructing this system are, realistic satellite 
FSW, realistic FSW executing environment, and a functional ground station to 
communicate with the emulated satellite. 
An example of such a satellite system test environment known as the Flight-Cyber 
Vulnerability Assessment Testbed has been developed and implemented by the Aerospace 
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Corporation (funded by the USAF and Aerospace Internal Research and Development) 
[48].  The vulnerability assessment testbed was developed to perform specific 
experiments supporting vulnerability assessments for USAF programs of record.  The 
vulnerability assessment testbed consists of two major components, the Unit Under Test 
(UUT), and testbed supporting infrastructure.  The UUT is the satellite being tested, and 
is the subject for experimentation.  The testbed supporting infrastructure provides all 
necessary hardware and software to communicate or otherwise interface with the  
UUT [48]. 
The satellite test environment developed for this research includes the major 
components found in the Aerospace testbed.  This research testbed is required to support 
CTMS testing once integrated into a satellite system.  The testbed components used in 
this work were selected to provide a realistic environment for satellite FSW security 
testing.  My test environment implementation details, including FSW development, 
ground station setup, and test components, are presented in Chapter IV. 
 
3.7   Summary 
This chapter presents the design features of the CTMS for application to satellite 
FSW. CTMS represents a unification of trust management theory and exiting TMS 
implementation architecture for the purpose of enhancing satellite system security.  The 
approach of CTMS is to merge concepts from a generic TMS framework into satellite 
FSW to mitigate threats associated with a specific abuse case. 
The CTMS architecture incorporates multiple trust mechanisms and a policy 
evaluation function to perform trust evaluations of entities within FSW.  The I-Trust 
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mechanisms fundamental objective is calculating trust values for entities based upon 
specific interaction markers.  The credential trust mechanism provides authentication by 
evaluating credentials provided by entities in the system.  The component trust values and 
information within the FSW are used by the policy evaluation function to define the 
systems response to activity in the system.  The CTMS API is used to access this 
functionality from satellite FSW applications.  
The concept of abuse case modeling is applied to the satellite FSW to test the security 
of critical components and to evaluate the CTMS.  System policy follows the abuse case 
to detect and prevent malicious activities.  Additionally, the specification of a satellite 
test environment is presented to serve as a realistic proof of concept for the application of 
trust management practices to secure satellite systems. 
In summation, the CTMS architecture once implemented is expected to improve 
security in satellite systems by detecting and preventing specific abuse cases.  In order to 
evaluate the feasibility and performance of the CTMS architecture, Chapter IV presents a 
CTMS implementation in realistic satellite FSW.  Finally, Chapter IV describes testing of 
the CTMS implementation with an abuse case and system policy. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
4.1   Chapter Overview 
This chapter documents the study of how trust management concepts can be used to 
protect a satellite system from a specific abuse case.  Satellite system protection is shown 
as the outcome of abuse case testing on satellite Flight Software (FSW).  The specific 
trust mechanisms within the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) 
architecture are characterized to determine their suitability for implementation in actual 
systems.  Additionally, implementation specific results of FSW performance are 
presented to demonstrate the feasibility of trust management integration into satellite 
systems. 
The goal of the current experimentation is to determine the applicability of trust 
management concepts in general, and CTMS specifically, to address satellite system 
threats embodied in the forgery attack abuse case.  The primary hypothesis is that the 
CTMS will improve security in FSW telecommanding.  This improvement in security is 
measured through the detection and prevention of a forgery attack with the CTMS. 
This research does not focus on completely securing the satellite system emulated in 
the test environment; rather, it develops a methodology which can address specific 
concerns regarding satellite security.  This methodology includes a specific architecture 
with which to incorporate trust management concepts into satellite system FSW. The 
experiments designed for this research apply the abuse case, system policy, and CTMS to 
the existing FSW as a proof of concept. 
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4.2   Test Environment Setup 
A functional satellite system is required to perform the work set forth in this thesis. 
To serve as a functional model of a satellite system, realistic FSW, dedicated flight 
hardware, and satellite commanding ground station software have been acquired and 
configured to emulate a satellite system.  An overall view of the satellite system emulated 
to conduct this work is shown in Figure 5. 
The satellite system consists of a single satellite, and two command ground stations.  
One of the command ground stations serves as a legitimate ground station which is 
authorized to command the satellite.  The second is a malicious ground station which will 
perform attack behavior as described in the abuse case. 
 
 
Figure 5 Test Satellite System 
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The satellite hardware is emulated with a microcontroller Test Board (TB) which is 
logically identical to the flight processor and memory for some CubeSat missions.  The 
microcontroller test board contains a processor which runs the 8051 instruction set.  
Along with the 8051 CPU, memory and digital communication peripherals are located on 
the TB.  The primary communication peripheral used is a Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver Transmitter (UART) which is connected to a Recommended Standard 232 
(RS232) transceiver onboard [49].  
The ground station hardware consists of a single computer workstation.  The 
computer workstation divides and shares hardware resources with multiple virtual 
computer workstations (virtual machines).  These virtual machines run the command 
ground station software which communicates with the emulated satellite/TB.   
The ground stations utilize USB ports and signal converters to connect with the RS232 
port on the TB. 
The legitimate command ground station in the satellite system is modeled by a virtual 
machine running Common Ground Architecture (CGA).  Mission unique components 
present in CGA were specifically designed to interact with the FSW.  The CGA ground 
station receives telemetry from the satellite and displays system status in formatted 
tables.  Additionally, commands can be sent from the CGA ground station to demonstrate 
functionality of the satellite FSW and hardware in the emulated environment. 
The malicious ground station in the satellite system is implemented by custom 
commanding software.  This commanding software was written to communicate with the 
satellite and perform malicious actions as described by the satellite commanding abuse 
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case.  The custom commanding software also implements new commands added to the 
FSW in conjunction with this thesis research. 
The satellite FSW is modeled after software currently operating on CubeSat missions.  
The FSW is written in the C programming language with specific 8051 assembly code for 
system initialization and critical operations.  The FSW was developed in the Keil 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE); which manages source code and compiles, 
links, and flashes complete software to the TB. 
To facilitate debugging of the system and to view transmissions between ground 
stations and satellite, a logic analyzer was connected to monitor UART signals on the test 
board.  The logic analyzer used for this testing was a USBee ZX module which reports 
the transmit and receive signals on the communication path between the TB and ground 
stations.  The entire test environment setup described is shown in Figure 6. 
Additional debugging and data output from experimentation was provided by a 
diagnostic port on the TB.  This port served as a window into the operation of the FSW 
and reported real time system status directly from the TB.  CTMS and FSW status was 
observed from this port along with any system errors generated during testing.  An 
illustrated test using this setup is presented in Appendix B. 
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Figure 6 Test Environment Setup 
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These actions would be accomplished during the development and testing phase for 
actual satellite mission.  The complete satellite and FSW incorporating all safety and 
security features would be fully integrated and tested prior to launch.  The following 
subsections describe the setup and operation of the two trust mechanisms, CTMS data 
storage, policy evaluation function, and CTMS API. 
4.3.1   Interaction-Based Trust Calculation. 
Calculations for interaction-based trust used in the CTMS implementation are 
performed as described in Section 3.3.3.1, with static values for α and β.  The I-Trust 
values are calculated for every command interaction, however, cannot be attributed to 
specific actors due to lack of user authentication in the basic FSW.  The lack of 
authentication leads to I-Trust values which characterize the trust of anonymous entities 
in the system.  The resultant I-Trust values are used in conjunction with system policy to 
make a final trust determination and define the systems response commands being 
received from anonymous entities. 
The command access security policies defines threshold values for I-Trust and states 
how these values will be acted upon in the system, see Section 4.5.  The first step in 
setting up this policy is to configure the I-Trust mechanism.  The initial I-Trust 
parameters are set to (T = 0,α = 0.05, β = -0.2) for the command authentication count 
marker based upon an initial characterization of the I-Trust algorithm.  Further discussion 
regarding the optimization of simple I-Trust parameters is found in Appendix A.  With 
these parameters set, the I-Trust value for this marker will fall below -0.5 after four 
consecutive defective interactions.  Section 4.7.2 discusses in detail the rationale behind 
why these parameters were chosen and their effect on the system. 
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The only I-Trust marker utilized during experimentation was the command 
authentication count marker.  Additional markers were considered, however were not 
utilized for experimentation.  Table 3 shows a list of markers which may be used in the 
CTMS system as implemented in this work. 
Table 3 CTMS I-Trust Marker List 
Marker Evidence Attributable 
Authentication Counter Identify poor connection or attempt on 
authentication counter 
NO* 
Check Vector Identify attempt on authentication crypto 
key 
NO 
Current Password Identify attempt on password, indicates 
compromised authentication crypto key 
YES** 
* If the command authentication counter is checked after credential trust 
authentication of a message the command authentication attempt can be attributed. 
 
** If the credential trust mechanism identifies an invalid password after successfully 
comparing the check vector then the attempt is attributed to the crypto key used to 
encrypt the credential. 
 
Both the simple and extended algorithms for calculating interaction trust were 
implemented in the course of this work.  Only the simple interaction trust algorithm was 
suitable for computing interaction trust using the authentication count marker.  This is 
due to the nature of the radio link used for satellite commanding, which is discussed 
further in Section 4.7.1. 
The simple interaction trust algorithm is suited for characterization of interactions 
with no incentive for repeated abuse after positive interactions.  This is the case for 
satellite commanding and the command authentication counter.  The extended trust 
algorithm may work well for interactions which benefit the attacker for presenting 
defective interactions after consecutive cooperation interactions.  This would be suitable 
for the protection of features prone to repeated abuse, i.e., the attacker gets benefit from 
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failing the marker check.  One example in the context of satellite systems would be for an 
attacker, once gaining access, to probe a satellite with known good commands for a 
number of interactions and then send a malformed command in an effort to disrupt the 
satellite. 
4.3.2   Credential Trust Evaluation. 
The credential trust mechanism implemented for experimentation utilized the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptography algorithm published in the Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 197 [50].  The AES source code used in 
this work was adapted from an open source implementation by Niyaz PK [51].  With the 
AES algorithm implemented as part of the CTMS, cryptographic verification of an 
authentication credential was possible in the FSW. 
AES was selected to provide cryptographic authentication due to its availability and 
the possibility for re-use in the system.  The AES functions implemented for 
authentication can also be used to add encryption to the commanding or telemetry 
communications to and from the satellite.  Additionally, AES is the CCSDS  proposed 
standard for encryption in satellite systems [30].  With a cryptographic algorithm 
implemented, an authentication credential was developed for processing by the credential 
trust mechanism. 
The authentication credential introduced for testing purposes consisted of the 
following elements: key index, check vector, and an encrypted password component.  
The key index was a value used to select the AES key for decryption of the password 
component of the credential.  The check vector was a random value used to introduce a 
random component to the message and to serve as a check upon decryption of the 
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password component.  The encrypted password component of the authentication 
credential consisted of a check vector, current authentication nonce, and next 
authentication nonce.  Figure 7 shows the structure of the authentication credential. 
The check vector in the encrypted password component was set to the same value as 
the vector in the authentication credential.  Upon decryption, the check vector from the 
encrypted password component was compared with the check vector from the 
authentication credential.  If the two vectors matched, the message was properly decoded 
with the key identified by the key index.  A positive check of the initialization vector is 
the result of a valid entity passing the credential or an invalid entity replaying the 
credential. 
 
 
Figure 7 Authentication Credential Structure 
 
The current nonce field in a credential was compared with the identification nonce 
stored in the credential trust mechanism.  If the current nonce from the encrypted 
password component matches the internal identification nonce, then the credential is 
deemed to be valid.  Each key index had an identification nonce associated with it for 
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entity identification.  A valid check of the credential was then associated with the key 
index and any activity related to this credential was attributed to the associated key index. 
The next nonce field contained the value to be stored as the identification nonce in the 
credential trust mechanism for the given key index.  The identification nonce was 
replaced with the next nonce value after processing the current credential.  The next 
nonce must be different from the current nonce.  If the current and next nonce are the 
same value in this system, the authentication credential could be successfully validated 
during a replay. 
With the credential trust mechanism, CTMS can validate entities in the system and 
associate them with trust information.  Entities authenticated by the credential trust 
mechanism were associated with CTMS members as defined in Table 4.  Additionally, 
secure functionality can be built into the system, which can be used to mitigate system 
threats.  An example of this is demonstrated by the experiments presented in Section 4.6. 
Table 4 Credential Trust List 
CTMS Member AES Key 
Index 
Authentication Password 
Index 
0 - Anonymous N/A N/A 
1 - Administrator 0 0 
 
The authentication credential structure and associated validation mechanism was 
developed for use in this research as a proof of concept for a generic authentication 
mechanism.  As such, extensive characterization and cryptanalysis of this implementation 
was not performed.  A validated cryptographically secure algorithm and implementation 
should be used for credential generation and authentication in the credential trust 
mechanism for a flight ready system. 
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4.3.3   Trust Data Storage. 
The Trust Data Storage component of the CTMS was used to maintain the systems 
current status.  Each entity interacting with the system, whether authenticated or not, was 
categorized into CTMS members.  The CTMS implementation contained data regarding 
CTMS members and their nominal mapping to ground station ID; see Table 5.  
Additionally, I-Trust data associated with each marker and entity was also stored in the 
Trust Data Storage component; see Table 6. 
Table 5 CTMS Member List 
CTMS 
Member 
Ground Station 
ID 
Role 
0 0001 Anonymous commanding 
1 0002 Administrator Level Authenticated Commanding 
 
Table 6 I-Trust Member Evidence List 
CTMS Member Marker 
ID 
I-Trust Marker 
0 - Anonymous 0 Authentication Count I-Trust Marker Simple 
   
1 - Administrator 0 Authentication Count I-Trust Marker Simple 
 1 Credential Check Vector I-Trust Marker Simple 
 2 Credential Current Password I-Trust Marker Simple 
 
4.3.4   API. 
The CTMS API implemented for testing consisted of function prototypes for the 
credential trust mechanism, I-Trust mechanism, and policy evaluation function.  The 
credential trust mechanism returned the credential validation status for a given ground 
station ID and credential.  The I-Trust mechanism did not return data directly to the 
calling function, however, it updated I-Trust data for a given ground station ID, marker 
ID and interaction result (cooperation or defection).  The policy evaluation function 
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returned the result of a policy evaluation for a given ground station ID and policy 
identifier. 
Specific API calls were made in the command handler application, as it was being 
tested by the commanding abuse case.  The CTMS API calls implemented in the FSW 
command handler application were to the I-Trust mechanism, credential trust mechanism 
and policy evaluation function.  The I-Trust mechanism was called to update trust 
evidence for an entity in the system using the command authentication count marker.  
The credential trust mechanism was used to implement the secure unlock command 
discussed in Section 4.6.  The policy evaluation function was used to prevent the abuse 
case presented in Section 4.4. 
 
4.4   Implementation Abuse Case 
Normal use for a satellite system requires commands to be transmitted from a ground 
station to the satellite.  These commands must be processed aboard the satellite to 
maintain the system and to perform the primary mission.  The design of command 
handling systems for satellites which only incorporate this simple use case with little 
regard for misuse or abuse of the system may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. 
The scenario presented here is the result of applying the abuse case development 
methodology presented in Section 3.4 to the system being used to implement and test the 
CTMS architecture.  This abuse case is modeled for the satellite telecommanding 
subsystem.  The specific component in the telecommanding subsystem that may be 
exploited is the command handler application of the satellite FSW. 
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For this case, a third party either has access to command formatting information, or 
can intercept transmissions emanating from the primary satellite ground station.  Once a 
command session has been recorded, satellite specific information is recovered from the 
command link data.  This information is then replayed with modified/malicious values in 
an effort to gain access to the satellite. 
The nature of the basic FSW is such that the simple replay of a previously transmitted 
authenticated command fails.  This is due to the incremental nature of the command 
sequence, where previously executed commands will not be processed.  These design 
characteristics of the FSW, however are vulnerable to a modified replay attack. 
The specific abuse case is a forgery attack by a malicious ground station.  This 
forgery attack is the replay of a previously transmitted legitimate message by an attacker.  
In an effort to guess the dynamic command authentication counter onboard the satellite, 
the authentication count field for the illegitimate message is incremented during the 
replay in an effort to brute force the authentication count in the FSW.  The intent is to 
have a malicious command processed.  See Table 7 for a summary of the steps involved 
in the abuse case. 
Table 7 Abuse case steps 
Step Action 
1 Record commanding session or otherwise acquire command header and format 
information 
2 Transmit desired malicious command in an attempt to have it processed by the 
satellite. 
3 If the command execution fails at the satellite, increment the authentication count in 
the command message and resend. 
4 Continue to increment the authentication count in the command sequence until the 
command is accepted. 
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The abuse case activity described in Table 7 is similar to the model of attack behavior 
against a space communication link published by researchers investigating command link 
attack detection [47].  This pattern is also similar to that taken by attackers to exploit 
terrestrial software and networks [52]. 
 
4.5   Implementation System Policy 
The system policies defined for this work were formulated to address the satellite 
telecommanding forgery attack.  The broad system security policy requires only 
legitimate commands be processed by the satellite.  This security policy must be enforced 
by a security mechanism.  The CTMS implementation is the security mechanism which 
was used to address this broad system security policy in the following experiments. 
The detailed system security policies used for CTMS implementation testing are 
shown in Table 8.  The first system security policy requires an alert to be logged once the 
I-Trust value for the authentication count marker reaches -0.5.  The result of this policy is 
attack activity detection based upon interaction trust calculation.  As each command is 
received, the I-Trust value is updated based upon a check of the command authentication 
count.  Failed checks will reduce the I-Trust value, while successful checks increase the 
value. 
Policy 2 is aimed at preventing the same attack activity detected with Policy 1.  Once 
the I-Trust value for the general ground station based upon the authentication count 
marker reaches -0.5 all commands from anonymous ground stations will be rejected. This 
policy results in denying unauthenticated users access to the system.  As this policy does 
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not specify the authentication of ground stations, it results in denial of service for all 
ground stations.  This issue is addressed with Policy 3. 
 
Table 8 Implemented Policy Options 
 Policy Implications 
 1. Trust Management Event Logging Only Credential Trust not required 
 Description:  Command authentication count is checked 
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for 
authentication count marker.  Once the I-Trust value for 
authentication count reaches  
-0.5 an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid 
command attempts.  
P- fewer satellite resources required 
P-legitimate ground station is alerted to 
review detailed logs 
N-malicious ground station may tamper 
with logs if access is acquired 
 2. Trust Management Event Logging and Prevention Credential Trust not required 
 Description:  Command authentication count is checked 
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for 
authentication count marker.  Once the I-Trust value for 
authentication count reaches 
 -0.5 command processing is halted for anonymous users 
and an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid 
command attempts.   
 
P-malicious behavior is prevented 
 
N-denial of service without entity 
authentication 
 3. Trust Management Event Logging, Prevention and 
Recovery 
Credential Trust required 
 Description:  Command authentication count is checked 
upon receipt and I-Trust value is calculated for 
authentication count marker.  Once the I-Trust value for 
authentication count reaches  
-0.5 command processing is halted for anonymous users 
and an alert is logged indicating excessive invalid 
command attempts.  The legitimate ground station must 
unlock satellite commanding and the CTMS via credential 
trust mechanism to resume commanding operations. 
 
P-legitimate ground station is alerted to 
review detailed logs 
P-malicious behavior is prevented 
P-additional features extend policy and 
security options 
N- additional satellite resources are 
required 
N-malicious ground station may tamper 
with logs if access is acquired 
  P - Positive attribute for system policy 
N -Negative attribute for system policy 
 
Policy 3 extends the second policy with a provision for resuming satellite 
commanding with credential authentication of entities.  Again, once the authentication 
count I-Trust value reaches -0.5, all commands from anonymous ground stations will be 
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rejected until the system state is acknowledged.  The system state is acknowledged and 
the trust management system is reset by an authenticated user with a secure CTMS 
unlock command.  This policy and implementation is intended to demonstrate that FSW 
with CTMS can detect and respond to a low trust commanding interaction pattern.  An 
example test of Policy 3 is presented in Appendix B. 
The system response based on this policy is defined in the command processing code 
(command handler) of the FSW.  The command handler filters commands from 
 un-trusted IDs and logs un-trusted commanding interactions with the CTMS functions.  
Logs pertaining to CTMS status are stored and can be relayed via telemetry to ground 
controllers. 
 
4.6   Experiment Design 
In order to evaluate the performance of the trust management system and implement 
command access policies, three FSW builds were developed and tested.  The first FSW 
build, referred to as the (Basic FSW), is based upon a CubeSat FSW implementation 
without trust management.  The second FSW build (FSW-A) expands on the Basic FSW 
with an initial CTMS implementation and the first two system security policies.  The 
final FSW build (FSW-B) implements the CTMS architecture including the credential 
trust mechanism and the third system security policy. 
With the credential trust mechanism, FSW-B implements the third security policy 
which requires entity identification.  This identification is performed through the addition 
of a secure unlock command to the FSW command handler application.  The secure 
unlock command utilizes the authentication credential presented earlier to identify a 
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legitimate ground station and restore access to anonymous commanding of the satellite.  
Table 9 illustrates the three FSW builds with their features, policies, and procedures used 
for testing. 
Table 9 Experiment Design 
 Build Features Test Policy Test Procedure 
Basic FSW 
 
Basic FSW + No 
modifications 
Broad System Policy:  
Only legitimate ground 
stations should command the 
satellite 
Apply abuse case and 
record results 
FSW-A 
 
Basic FSW + CTMS 
without Credential Trust 
Policy 1 and 2 implemented 
with CTMS; see Table 8 
Apply abuse case and 
record results for each 
policy 
FSW-B 
 
Basic FSW + CTMS 
with Credential Trust and 
secure unlock command 
Policy 3 implemented with 
CTMS; see Table 8 
Apply abuse case and 
record results; execute 
secure CTMS reset 
command and record 
results 
 
The abuse case was presented to each FSW with results shown in Section 4.7.  The 
outcome of the tests are presented with a focus on determining if an outsider can 
successfully intrude on a commanding session or otherwise access the satellite using the 
abuse case.  An illustrated example of the experiment procedure for FSW-B and Policy 3 
is presented in Appendix B. 
 
4.7   Experiment Results 
This section presents experimentation results from the abuse case scenarios, 
comparing the three FSW builds.  Additionally, characteristics of the FSW builds are 
presented to support conclusions regarding the feasibility of implementing the CTMS 
architecture in satellite systems.  Lastly, performance of the implemented CTMS 
 73 
 
architecture is presented as it relates to the accurate detection of the forgery attack on the 
satellite system. 
The Basic FSW was exposed to the commanding abuse case in the first experiment.  
This experiment resulted in a system compromise by the malicious ground station 
executing commands on the satellite.  This activity is prohibited by the general system 
policy which limits access to the legitimate ground station. 
FSW-A with Policy 1 was utilized in the second experiment where the satellite was 
challenged by the commanding abuse case.  The system was again compromised, 
however the CTMS implementation successfully reported the malicious activity.  The 
broad system policy to deny unauthorized access to the satellite was violated, however 
test Policy 1 was successfully enforced. 
For experiment three, FSW-A with Policy 2 was tested with the forgery attack.  The 
malicious ground station was unable to execute commands on the satellite.  However, by 
blocking the malicious ground station Policy 2 also caused a denial of service for all 
ground stations.  This denial of service is due to the lack of entity authentication in the 
FSW-A build.  The broad system policy to deny access to malicious ground stations was 
enforced along with Policy 2. 
The fourth and final experiment utilized the FSW-B build, which implemented 
system security Policy 3.  When the forgery attack was applied to this FSW build, the 
malicious activity was detected through the I-Trust mechanism with the command 
authentication count marker.  Upon detection of the activity, an alert was logged and 
anonymous commanding was disabled.  These actions satisfied the general security 
policy.  A secure CTMS unlock command was then transmitted from a legitimate ground 
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station with identifying credential, which was subsequently processed by the satellite.  
Normal commanding operations were restored on the satellite with the secure CTMS 
unlock command.  The fourth experiment demonstrated the FSW-B successfully enforced 
Policy 3, which prevented malicious commanding of the satellite.  The malicious 
commanding activity presented in these experiments is a specific forgery attack presented 
in the telecommanding abuse case, Section 4.4.  An overview of the experimentation 
results for the three FSW builds and policies is shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Experiment Results 
FSW Build Test Policy Test Results 
Basic FSW 
 
Broad System Policy: Only 
legitimate ground stations should 
command the satellite 
Broad System Policy: Failure 
Note: 
malicious ground station gains access 
FSW-A 
 
Policy 1: 
Trust Management Event Logging 
Only; 
see Table 8 
Broad System Policy: Failure 
Policy 1 Implementation: Success 
Note: 
malicious ground station gains access 
FSW-A 
 
Policy 2: 
Trust Management Event Logging and 
Prevention; 
see Table 8 
Broad System Policy: Success 
Policy 2 Implementation: Success 
Note: 
malicious ground station denied 
access; 
denial of service experienced 
FSW-B 
 
Policy 3: 
Trust Management Event Logging, 
Prevention and Recovery; 
see Table 8 
Broad System Policy: Success 
Policy 3 Implementation: Success 
Note: 
malicious ground station denied 
access 
 
In summary, basic FSW takes no specific action to prevent or report malicious 
activity as described in the commanding abuse case.  When the abuse case is applied to 
the basic FSW, malicious commands are successfully executed when the authentication 
counter is reached during the forgery attack.  This scenario, when presented to FSW-B is 
identified and processing of the malicious commands is prevented.  These results serve to 
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validate the initial hypothesis that trust management principals can be applied to satellite 
systems to detect and prevent malicious activity. 
 
4.7.1   System Performance. 
This section discusses the I-Trust mechanism's performance for detecting the forgety 
attack abuse case.  For satellite commanding operations, signals are transmitted from a 
ground station through open space to the satellite orbiting above.  This transmission path 
has characteristics which affect transmitted messages.  The primary factor to be 
considered in this research for the command link is the Bit Error Rate (BER). 
The command link BER directly affects the number of command messages that are 
improperly transmitted to the receiver aboard the satellite.  This phenomenon affects both 
malicious and legitimate ground stations resulting in legitimate ground stations 
occasionally transmitting a command with an invalid command authentication count.  
Each satellite system in operation has different satellite commanding procedures and 
command link parameters.  Both of these factors contribute to the number of commands 
received at the satellite with an invalid authentication count. 
Due to the nature of satellite commanding in which legitimate commands are lost in 
transmission, a simple counter for the number of invalid commands received is not 
directly suitable for security monitoring.  The I-Trust mechanism utilized in the CTMS 
calculates a trust value for entities interacting with the satellite.  This value is based upon 
the quality of interactions relative to an I-Trust marker.  The marker for these interactions 
demonstrated in this work is the command authentication count.  As previously 
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discussed, legitimate and malicious ground stations will present commands with invalid 
authentication counts. 
The I-Trust mechanism adjusts the trust value for anonymous entities based the 
command authentication count field in messages received.  An encounter with a 
malicious entity is flagged when the I-Trust value falls below a specified threshold value.  
This threshold value, along with the parameters that determine the I-Trust mechanisms 
operation, must be set according to the specific system in which it is implemented.  These 
settings are determined based upon the number of commands typically lost during a 
commanding session with a legitimate ground station.  Appendix A presents a method 
and results of optimizing the simple I-Trust algorithm parameters for the command 
authentication count marker.  The performance characteristics for optimal I-Trust 
parameters are also discussed in Appendix A. 
4.7.2   System Characteristics. 
The primary goal of demonstrating CTMS architecture in an emulated satellite system 
environment was to determine the feasibility of implementation in flight ready satellite 
systems.  The characteristics which contribute to the implementations feasibility are 
Software Compile Size, RAM Utilization, and Function Execution Speed.  These 
characteristics are significant to the implementation of new features into satellite flight 
software due to a satellites limited hardware resources.  A summary of Compile Size and 
RAM utilization for the Basic FSW and FSW-B builds is shown in Table 11.  
Additionally, the performance of specific functions which implement the CTMS 
architecture is shown in terms of execution time in Table 12. 
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Table 11 FSW Build Characteristics 
FSW Build Constant Data Code RAM 
FSW-B 
 2111 Bytes 61443 Bytes 50725 Bytes 
Basic FSW 
 1687 Bytes 51547 Bytes 48600 Bytes 
Difference 424 Bytes 9896 Bytes 2125 Bytes 
 
Table 12 CTMS Function Performance 
CTMS Function Execution Time 
Simple Interaction 2.4 ms 
Policy Evaluation 0.76 ms 
Credential Evaluation (AES Decrypt) 21 ms 
 
The compiled characteristics for the FSW builds illustrate the increase in memory 
usage for an example implementation of the CTMS architecture.  Additionally, the 
function performance shows the added computational time required to process 
interactions, policies, and credentials with the CTMS implementation.  The performance 
measure taken for the credential evaluation function incorporates the initialization of the 
AES cryptography function and decryption of the single block of data in the credential. 
Each satellite system has unique requirements for hardware and software 
configurations.  Engineers must balance these requirements by making decisions as to 
which features to implement in the system.  Based upon the data presented above, an 
initial estimate for the system impacts of adding a TMS to a CubeSat mission is realized. 
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V. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
5.1   Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the conclusions and implications of this thesis.  Conclusions 
for this research focus on the primary thesis question.  Additionally, ancillary findings 
derived from experimentation are discussed.  Finally, recommendations for future 
research are made. 
This work developed a multi mechanism Trust Management System (TMS) to 
address cyber threats to satellite systems.  Additionally, methods for threat assessment 
and vulnerability analysis were presented for use in satellite system development and 
testing.  Chapter I introduced the research problem and focus.  Chapter II presented an 
introduction to the satellite system domain along with computer security and trust 
management principles.  Chapter III covered my approach to the problem and introduced 
the proposed TMS architecture for satellite telecommanding.  Chapter III also covered 
system security policy, telecommanding abuse case, and satellite Flight Software (FSW) 
test environment development methodology.  Chapter IV presented the test setup used for 
experimentation and integration of the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) 
with satellite FSW.  Additionally, Chapter IV illustrated the specific forgery attack 
satellite telecommanding abuse case, and policy used for testing the CTMS 
implementation.  Experiment design, results, and system performance were also 
presented in Chapter IV. 
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5.2   Conclusions of Research 
This thesis demonstrates the development and use of a TMS to detect the presence 
of a telecommand forgery attack on satellite FSW.  Once detected, the satellite FSW can 
log or prevent the attack activity.  The advantage of using trust management concepts for 
security in satellite systems is their ability to manage data quality, whereas traditional 
security mechanisms such as cryptography and access control schemes cannot. 
The primary research question of this thesis was to study the application of trust 
management concepts from the distributed information systems domain to satellite 
telecommanding.  This cross application of research was hypothesized to enhance 
security in satellite system telecommanding by allowing the detection and denial of 
adversaries exploiting the command link.  This primary research question was broken 
down into smaller tasks or incremental research questions to fully address the complex 
nature of the problem. 
The first incremental research question was to assess the vulnerability of the basic 
FSW used as a model in this work.  This was accomplished by implementing the basic 
FSW in the emulated satellite system test environment and applying the forgery attack 
abuse case.  Once the basic FSW was shown to be vulnerable to the forgery attack the 
effectiveness of the trust management approach could be measured. 
The trust management approach addresses the second incremental research 
question of whether a TMS can be used to detect the forgery attack.  This question was 
addressed by implementing the CTMS architecture in the basic FSW and applying the 
forgery attack abuse case.  Characterization of the FSW with CTMS demonstrated that 
the system could detect the forgery attack event with a high reliability.  The performance 
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of the CMTS architecture can be tuned based upon the environment in which it is 
operating.  A method of selecting tuning parameters for the CTMS architecture was 
developed and presented in Appendix A for application of the architecture to any specific 
satellite system.  This flexible performance selection feature of the CTMS makes it a 
robust option for threat detection in satellite FSW. 
The third incremental research question in support of this thesis addressed the 
ability to implement multiple system security policies with the CTMS architecture. The 
security policies tested addressed the detection and prevention of the telecommanding 
forgery attack.  The policies implemented exercised all components of the CTMS 
architecture including the Interaction Trust (I-Trust) and credential mechanisms.  With 
the FSW, CTMS implementation, and system security policies configured, the system 
was tested with the telecommand forgery attack.  These tests demonstrated that the 
CTMS architecture implementation can successfully detect the forgery attack and prevent 
the execution of malicious commands transmitted by an attacker.  As the basic FSW has 
no inherent user authentication, these malicious commands were prevented by denying all 
anonymous commands.  Notification of the malicious activity and normal system 
operation was subsequently recovered through the use of a secure command which 
utilizes the credential trust mechanism for authentication. 
The tests performed in this work demonstrates how the CTMS architecture can be 
used in a satellite system.  Through this testing it was shown that the CTMS architecture 
can be used to consolidate and provide security functions to FSW applications.  
Additionally, the CTMS architecture has demonstrated potential to be used in conjunction 
with existing safety and security features found in current satellite systems.  An example 
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of these findings is to either merge existing cryptographic authentication with the CTMS 
architecture as a new trust mechanism, or to simply apply the CTMS architecture in 
parallel with a dedicated authentication protocol.  For the case of a parallel 
implementation, the authentication protocol would be used to associate entities with trust 
evidence within the CTMS and also be used for policy evaluation. 
Results from the incremental research questions prove the hypothesis that trust 
management principles may be applied to satellite system telecommanding to enhance 
security.  The work completed in this thesis is the demonstration of a powerful new 
satellite security methodology and tool. This approach can not only be used to protect 
satellites from the specific forgery attack case presented here, however may be applied as 
a method to protect satellites from a wide range of threats. 
 
5.3   Recommendations for Future Research 
This work consisted of an effort to bring trust management practices from the 
distributed information systems and computer security domain to satellite system FSW.  
The concepts presented in this thesis can be extended in several ways. 
First, further identification and characterization of satellite system abuse cases 
will benefit work towards securing these systems.  New abuse cases can then be applied 
to satellite systems to identify vulnerabilities, which can then be addressed with trust 
management architectures such as CTMS.  Second, further characterization of the I-Trust 
calculation methods can be performed to better understand how to apply the algorithms to 
solve security problems in satellite systems.  Finally, a more detailed implementation of 
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CTMS could be applied to a FSW with authentication and encryption to further 
demonstrate the TMS capabilities in supporting these traditional security mechanisms. 
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Appendix A. Simple I-Trust Algorithm Optimization 
The command authentication count used in a satellite telecommanding 
architecture is primarily a safety feature.  The function of the command authentication 
count is to identify commands which are received out of sequence.  The typical response 
to receiving a command with an invalid authentication count is to discard the message.  
This response inadvertently addresses commands sent with malicious intent.  A third 
party whom is unaware of the current command authentication count in the satellite will 
be unable to transmit valid commands to be processed by the satellite.  This indicates a 
potential security benefit of the command authentication count feature. 
In order to evaluate the command authentication count for use as a security 
mechanism, an analysis of the feature's properties is performed.  The first issue addressed 
is the probability an attacker will accurately guess the authentication count.  Second is 
how to detect an attacker attempting to access the system by guessing the authentication 
count.  Lastly, an analysis of the Interaction Trust (I-Trust) mechanism and optimization 
of the I-Trust configuration parameters is presented. 
The probability an attacker will guess the authentication count is directly related 
to the range of values for the authentication count field.  The authentication count used as 
a demonstration implementation in this work is a 16-bit variable.  This results in 162  
possible values with a maximum of 65,535 and a minimum of 0.  An adversary 
attempting to guess this value has a one in 65,536 chance to succeed on the first try.  
Using the forgery attack scenario an attacker will choose a value only once and the 
probability of correctly selecting the authentication count is computed with Equation 1.  
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The number of attempts to guess the authentication count is n and the probability of 
success will increase with each attempt.  At this rate the attacker  must try 656 times to 
have approximately 1% chance of guessing the authentication count. 
1
16
0
1
2
n
x
P
x


   
Equation 1 Probability  
 
An attacker attempting to access a system utilizing an authentication counter must 
first acquire the current authentication count.  One attack scenario presented in this work 
involves the attacker sending multiple commands with an incrementally different 
authentication count for each.  This method of starting from an initial value for the 
authentication count and making a series of attempts with sequential authentication count 
values allows the attacker to cover all values of the authentication counter and access the 
satellite. 
Abuse of the command authentication with this activity leaves evidence in the 
satellite system.  This evidence is the pattern and history of commands received by the 
system with an invalid authentication count.  The evidence will appear differently 
depending on whether this attempt is made independent of a legitimate ground station's 
telecommanding session or during a legitimate telecommanding session. 
Failure to present the proper authentication count can indicate either indicate lost 
legitimate commands or the presence of an attacker attempting illegitimate commands.  
In order to differentiate between legitimate ground station and attacker in a commanding 
encounter, these authentication failures are aggregated with the use of an I-Trust 
algorithm.  This algorithm computes a value which is an indicator of the reliability or 
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trustworthiness of a remote system.  The algorithm computes the trust value based upon 
an interaction's modification of a specific marker in the system.  If the marker indicates 
cooperation by the remote system then the interaction trust value is increased.  
Conversely, if the marker indicates defection by the remote system the interaction trust 
value is reduced.  This system of computing a trust value which incorporates the outcome 
of interactions is used to detect the presence of an attacker in the system. 
The particular algorithm used to perform this trust value calculation is adapted 
from the agent rating process presented by Yu and Sing. This algorithm utilizes two 
parameters to define how much the trust value should increase or decrease following an 
interaction.  The environment in which this algorithm is being used will have an effect on 
how these parameters should be set.  The remainder of this Appendix documents the 
characterization of the satellite system telecommanding environment relevant to the 
command authentication counter.  Additionally, a procedure for optimizing the algorithm 
parameters used to detect attack behavior in the command system is presented. 
The optimization and characterization of the simple I-Trust algorithm is presented 
in the context of malicious activity detection in satellite system telecommanding.  The 
algorithm parameter optimization is presented in steps to configure the I-Trust algorithm 
for a particular satellite system.  This procedure was developed after the analysis and 
optimization of the algorithm's parameters α and β for a specific satellite system. 
The first step to configure the I-Trust algorithm is to establish a desired false 
negative threshold. This threshold is based upon the users tolerance for potential false 
negatives in the system.  For this example, a value of 0.001 is chosen.  This indicates that 
the user will accept at the very most a one in one thousand chance an attacker will 
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succeed unnoticed.  This value is used to compute the approximate maximum number of 
command attempts which are made during an attack on the system before being detected. 
The calculation is performed by multiplying the probability of success by the 
number of possible values in the command authentication counter.  For my test system, 
the command authentication counter is 16 bits, which results in 65,536 possible values. 
See Figure 8 Attempt Approximation Formula for the approximation formula and 
example computation.  Alternatively, the user may pick the number of attempts an 
attacker may make on the system and compute the false negative probability. 
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Figure 8 Attempt Approximation Formula 
 
The second step in configuring optimal parameters for the I-Trust algorithm is to 
establish a system security policy, which sets a threshold on the I-Trust value.  This 
policy limit value is also related to the security posture of the system.  A high value (less 
negative) will result in a sensitive system, which is in turn more susceptible to false 
positives.  A low value will result in a system which requires higher penalties to reach the 
policy limit.  This is due to the requirement to identify malicious behavior within the 
number of defection interactions calculated in step one. 
The value of -0.8 was chosen and is used here as it falls just below the 
approximately linear portion of the trust curve for a series of defection interactions.  This 
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is best illustrated by the attack curve in Figure 17.  A policy limit at the end of this 
approximately linear portion of the curve allows the system to accommodate both a high 
security posture and low false positive rate. 
With the chosen security policy limit on the I-Trust value, the third step to 
configure the I-Trust mechanism is to establish a bound for the value β.  This is done by 
computing the final trust value after  65 defections with consecutively decreasing values 
of β.  The iteration that results in a final trust value less than or equal to the policy limit 
value, e.g., -0.8 is the upper bound on the β parameter.  No α value is required to compute 
this bound for β as all of the interactions used in the calculation are defection.  This 
method is also described by the pseudo code in Figure 9. 
for(Beta = -.0001; Beta >= -.5; Beta = Beta - .0001){ 
T = 0; // I-Trust Variable 
 for(count = 1; count <= MAX_ATTEMPTS; count++){ 
Simple_Interaction(Defection); // Computes I-Trust with 
Beta 
 } 
 if (T <= POLICY_LIMIT){ 
 return Beta; 
 }  
} 
Figure 9 Beta Bound Pseudo Code 
The fourth step is to determine additional bounds for α and β.  These bounds are 
used to reduce the search space required to establish the optimal I-Trust parameters for a 
specific system.  With the upper bound for β computed previously, the lower bound for β 
along with bounds for α are established. 
The lower bound on β is based upon the nature of the modeled behavior and the 
design of the I-Trust algorithm.  This lower bound for β is set at -0.5 for this system 
optimization, as higher values would be unrealistic for this.  As the parameter beta 
approaches -0.5, the parameter α must also increase in magnitude to avoid false positives 
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in the system.  Values for β above -0.5 do not provide effective results when modeling 
trust based on the command authentication count.  This is due to instability associated 
with large β values and the associated large α values required to maintain low false 
positive rates.  The bounds for β as discussed are shown on a number line representing 
the search space for optimal α and β values, see Figure 10. 
With both bounds for β established, the bounds for optimal α are addressed.  The 
upper bound for α is limited by the absolute value of β.  Additionally, the α parameter has 
a lower bound of zero.  The zero α lower bound is a result of the positive nature of the α 
parameter discussed in Section 3.3.3.1.  These relationships are also captured in Figure 3, 
which highlights the bounds and exclusion areas for α and β.  The exclusion areas are 
marked by hashed boxes, which indicate values not included in the parameter search.  
Horizontal arrows on the number line indicate the direction of the parameter search. 
β
‐.5
β‐Bound 
α
Min Effective β
α ≤|β|
Optimal α, β Search Space
 
Figure 10 Number Line for Optimizing α and β Parameters 
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The final step in configuring the I-Trust mechanism is to search the possible 
values of α and β that provides the fewest false positives, and meets the desired security 
posture.  Searching the available values of α and β requires additional information 
regarding the system being configured.  The critical factors based upon system design 
necessary to perform α, β optimization are the expected failure (defection) rate for a 
legitimate user and the number of interactions per encounter.  Additionally, the 
configurable search parameters are: the step size for incrementing α and β, the number of 
times to sample each random encounter, the desired maximum false positive rate for the 
system, and bounds for average trust value.  The average trust value relates directly to the 
desired system security posture by keeping I-Trust values balanced which enables 
reliable detection of an attack during a command encounter. 
The search method used to identify the optimal α and β values begins with a loop 
over the β value starting at the previously established upper bound.  This β loop will run a 
second loop which will search α from zero to the absolute value of the current β.  These 
nested loops will cover the bounded values for both I-Trust algorithm parameters, see 
Figure 11.  
for(Beta = Beta_Bound; Beta >= -.5; Beta = Beta - BETA_INCREMENT){ 
 for(Alpha = 0; Alpha <= absval(Beta); Alpha = Alpha + 
ALPHA_INCREMENT){ 
  Series_Of_Encounters(); 
} 
} 
Figure 11 α and β Loop Pseudo Code 
Within the α loop, a series of encounters are executed base upon the number 
established by the search parameter.  This series of encounters is a loop over the number 
of encounters which computes each series of interactions.  The number of encounters 
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computed should be large enough to significantly indicate the average number of false 
positives the system will generate per encounter.  The average interaction trust value for 
each encounter is computed, along with the average of all encounters for a given set of 
parameters (α, β).  Additionally, the number of false positives experienced during the 
series of encounters is calculated.  Pseudo code for the series of encounters loop is shown 
in Figure 12. 
 
Series_Of_Encounters(){ 
 for(Encounter = 0; Encounter < RANDOM_ENCOUNTERS; Encounter++){ 
  Interaction_Series(); 
  if (ISeries_False_Positive > 1){ 
   Encounter_False_Positive++; 
  } 
  ISeries_Avg_Sum = ISeries_Avg_Sum + ISeries_Avg; 
 }  
 Encounter_Trust_Avg = ISeries_Avg_Sum / RANDOM_ENCOUNTERS; 
} 
Figure 12 Series of Encounters Pseudo Code 
 
The series of encounters loop contains a loop to execute a series of interactions in 
an encounter.  This interaction series loop processes the number of interactions specified 
for each encounter, while calculating statistics necessary for the series of encounters.  
Each interaction is determined to be either cooperation or defection based upon the 
system being modeled.  In this case each legitimate interaction has a one in ten chance of 
being defection.  If at any time in the interaction series the trust value falls below the 
policy limit, a false positive is counted.  A pseudo code example of this loop is shown in 
Figure 13. 
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Interaction_Series(){ 
//All variables are initialized to zero 
 for (Interaction = 1; Interaction <= NUM_INTERACTIONS; 
Interaction++){ 
  if ((rand() % 10 + 1) == 1) IR=0; 
  else IR=1; 
  // Run the random interaciton through the Simple Trust 
Algorithm 
  // Alpha and Beta are set by their loops 
// An interaction of 0 is defection; 1 is cooperation 
  Simple_Interaction(IR); 
  // Check for false positive in interaction set 
  if(T <= POLICY_LIMIT){ 
   ISeries_False_Pos ++ ; 
  } 
  //Accumulate a sum to average the Interaction Trust Values 
  ITrust_Sum = ITrust_Sum + T; 
 } 
 // Calculate the average interaction trust value 
 ISeries_Avg = ITrust_Sum / NUM_INTERACTIONS; 
} 
Figure 13 Interaction Series Pseudo Code 
The search for optimal I-Trust parameters is complete when user conditions are 
met with regards to false positives and average trust value.  These parameters are checked 
at the end of each series of encounters and are reported as the result of the optimization 
for α and β.  The initial values returned from the search are optimized based upon the 
input parameters.  The results of this process is illustrated with a complete example; see 
Table 13.  A sample screen shot from the optimization tool which calculated the optimal 
I-Trust parameters is shown in Figure 14. 
Table 13 Optimization Example 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimization Example Setup Optimization Example Results 
False Negative Rate .001 Attempts 65 
Policy Limit -.8 β Bound  -.0245 
Step Size .0005 α Result .0025 
False Positive Rate 0 β Result -.0245 
Average Trust Value ±.06 Result Avg Trust -.04 
Expected Failure Rate 1/10 False Positives 0 
Interactions Per 
Encounter 
200  
Encounter Samples 1,000 
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Figure 14 I-Trust Parameter Optimization Tool 
 
With an input of 0.001 for an acceptable false negative rate the resulting number 
of attempts is 65.  The policy limit of -0.8 establishes an initial bound for β of (-0.0245).  
The initial result is α = 0.0025, β = -0.0245, which meets the requirements for false 
positives and average trust rating.  A graph displaying this result for Example 1 is shown 
in Figure 15.  From the graph of the interaction trust value versus interaction number we 
see the trust value drops below the policy limit exactly at the required 65 interactions for 
the initial abuse case (where the red line crosses -0.8).  Additionally, the legitimate user 
will maintain an average trust rating of 0.04. 
A second abuse case is also shown where the attacker transmits commands to be 
processed during the legitimate ground station's command session.  This activity begins 
at interaction 50 and continues through the end of the simulation.  The I-Trust value for 
this case drops below the policy limit before the end of the encounter, however it requires 
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more defection interactions to reach this limit.  This is due to the occasional cooperation 
interactions supplied by the legitimate ground station. 
 
Figure 15 Example 1: Initial I-Trust Optimization 
 
While the α and β values in the Example 1 result are optimal for the input 
requirements, they can be enhanced for faster response to the malicious events while 
maintaining a low false positive rate.  This is achieved by continuing the search process 
through α, β and selecting a set of parameters which results in zero false positives after an 
increment in β which results in extensive false positives.  This selection of I-Trust 
parameters is made without consideration for the trust average.  The resulting parameters 
are taken at the point where the minimum α is given for the current β, while maintaining 
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a user acceptable false positive rate.  By selecting this solution we get increased security 
potential with minimal false positives.  An example which illustrates this solution is 
shown in Figure 16, with optimization settings in Table 14. 
 
Figure 16 Optimization Example 2: No Average Constraint, Min Alpha for Beta 
 
Table 14 Optimization Example 2 
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I-Trust 
Value
Interaction
Optimization Example Setup Optimization Example Results 
False Negative Rate .00015 Attempts 9 
Policy Limit -.8 β Bound  N/A 
Step Size .0005 α Result .0295 
False Positive Rate 0 β Result -.1638 
Average Trust Value N/A Result Avg Trust .675 
Expected Failure Rate 1/10 False Positives 0 
Interactions Per 
Encounter 
200  
Encounter Samples 1,000 
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Example 2 shows increased performance for identifying the initial attack pattern, 
with 9 attempts bringing the trust value down to the policy limit.  Additionally, the 
number of false positives for the series of encounters is zero, which is the same as in 
Example 1.  This modified method of selecting α and β results in a higher overall trust 
average of 0.675, which may not be suitable when identifying attacks during extended 
encounters.  An example of where this optimization would not fit a mission requirement 
is where emphasis is placed on the threat of an attacker intruding on an ongoing 
command session.  With reference to Figure 16, if an attacker were to begin the forgery 
attack after legitimate interaction 150 instead of 50 as shown, the system would require 
additional defection interactions to identify the attack.  This results in a final method for 
selecting optimal α and β parameters. 
Both methods for optimizing selecting I-Trust configuration parameters are 
combined, which will result in: minimum α for the current β, an overall average trust 
rating within a specified range, and false positives within a user defined range.  Results 
from this selection method can identify an attack independent of an active legitimate 
commanding session in fewer interactions than the initial method.  Additionally, this 
selection method provides an active defense posture during a legitimate commanding 
session not seen with the first two selection methods.  An example of optimization results 
utilizing this selection method are shown in Table 15 and Figure 17. 
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Table 15 Optimization Example 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Optimization Example 3: Average Constraint, Minimum Alpha for Beta 
 
Example 3 shows the result of the optimization incorporating the minimum α for 
β, constrained average trust rating, and constrained false positives.  The key benefit of 
this method is a compromise between initial security and extended defense posture.  The 
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False Negative Rate .00035 Attempts 22 
Policy Limit -.8 β Bound  N/A 
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Average Trust Value ±.06 Result Avg Trust .059 
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low absolute value of average trust rating provides relatively constant threat response 
throughout a command encounter.  False positives are also managed with this method 
with zero false positives reported in 1,000 command encounter samples. 
The optimization results with constrained average, false positives , and minimum 
α can only exist within a small band of possible parameter values.  These represent the 
globally optimum results and are acquired by searching the parameter space starting from 
high values of β.  Figure 18 illustrates pseudo code implementing the three methods of 
selecting and reporting results from the parameter optimization. 
if (Encounter_Trust_Avg > -1 * AVG_TRUST && Encounter_Trust_Avg < 
AVG_TRUST){ 
//Extract Result "Initial Optimization - Average in range" 
{ 
 
if((false_pos_sum < false_pos_prev)&&(false_pos_sum <= 
FALSE_POS_RATE)){ 
 if ((Encounter_Trust_Avg > -1 * AVG_TRUST) && 
(Encounter_Trust_Avg < AVG_TRUST)){ 
          //Extract Result "Average in range, Minimum Alpha for Current 
Beta" 
{ 
 else{ 
    //Extract Result "Minimum Alpha for Current Beta" 
 } 
} 
false_pos_prev = false_pos_sum; 
 
Figure 18 Optimization Result Selection 
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Appendix B. Illustrated CTMS Test Sequence 
Utilizing the test environment described in Section 4.2, three Flight Software 
(FSW) builds were tested with the forgery attack sequence presented in Section 4.4.  The 
FSW build used in the following illustrations is FSW-B, which consisted of basic 
CubeSat FSW with the Consolidated Trust Management System (CTMS) architecture 
implementation.  The FSW was also modified to utilize the CTMS implementation by 
inserting CTMS Application Programming Interface (API) calls into the command 
handler application to monitor command interactions and enforce policy actions.  
Furthermore, a CTMS specific telecommand (secure unlock) was added to the basic 
flight software which utilizes the credential trust mechanism to authenticate ground 
stations.  The CTMS secure unlock command was used in this test scenario to 
acknowledge the detection of an attack sequence and to restore commanding 
functionality for anonymous ground stations.  This is necessary as anonymous 
commanding can be disabled by system security Policy 3 described in Section 4.5. 
The first step in this example CTMS test sequence corresponds to a normal 
satellite telecommanding scenario.  The legitimate ground station in this step transmits a 
sequence of commands without user authentication to the satellite.  This activity 
increments the satellite's onboard command authentication counter and increases the 
Interaction Trust (I-Trust) value for the anonymous CTMS user. 
The satellite diagnostic port is monitored during the legitimate command 
sequence.  The diagnostic port displays the following information: the byte pattern for 
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each command received, command specific details, a policy evaluation result, and the 
current CTMS I-Trust data.  Figure 19 is the last message displayed on the satellite 
diagnostic port after the legitimate command sequence is completed. 
The first line in the diagnostic output shown in Figure 19 is the byte sequence for 
the last telecommand received.  The second line is a header indicating the following five 
lines are details regarding the processing of the last command received.  These details 
indicate what type of message was received (MessageID), the result of a policy check 
(Trust OK...), and the action following the policy check (CMD... will be processed).  The 
remaining information is the current CTMS I-Trust data.  This data indicates that the 
entity tracked in the TMS with MemberID 0 has two associated simple I-Trust metrics.  
MemberID 0 represents interactions from unauthenticated users.  The I-Trust metrics 
correspond to trust values computed based upon the command authentication count 
marker using the simple I-Trust algorithm.  The reason for computing multiple trust 
values for the same marker is to demonstrate the configurable nature of the CTMS 
architecture to match a target systems specific performance profile.  The topic of 
performance is addressed further in Section 4.7.1 and Appendix A. 
 
Figure 19 Step 1, Satellite Diagnostic Port Output 
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The I-Trust values displayed for Metric 0 and Metric 1 are positive values, which 
indicate the series of legitimate commands received during the normal command 
sequence.  These values were both initialized to zero and have different values in  
Figure 19 due to each metric being associated with individual I-Trust parameters as 
shown.  MetricID 0 is used in the policy evaluation for this experiment, and as the trust 
value for this metric is above the policy limit of -0.5 the command was processed. 
The second step in the CTMS test is the execution of a forgery attack on the 
satellite.  This attack is an instance of the abuse case described in Section 4.4.  Once the 
legitimate command session has completed and the satellite has moved into the attackers 
field of view, the malicious sequence of commands are transmitted. 
The malicious commands in this experiment are transmitted by a custom 
commanding tool.  These commands are similar to those which were sent by CGA in 
Step 1, however the proper command authentication count is unknown to the attacker.  
Figure 20 shows the custom commanding tool setup for this step of the experiment. 
The command selected for transmission is a simple no operation command.  This 
commands only function is to test the command transmission and execution path.  Below 
the command selection in Figure 20 are the command header fields, which are setup for 
the no operation command.  There are no arguments for this command so the command 
data field is blank.  The Command Authentication Count (Auth Count) field is shaded to 
indicate that for the forgery attack this field will be incremented after transmission for the 
number of attempts indicated. 
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Figure 20 Step 2, Custom Commanding Tool Setup 
 
 
Figure 21 Step 2, Invalid Command Authentication Count Error 
 
During the attack, telecommands are received by the satellite with an invalid 
command authentication count value.  The error generated by this activity can be seen on 
the diagnostic port, see Figure 21.  Portions of the diagnostic output from the last 
legitimate command processed remains on the screen while the attackers command and 
error information are below.  Each command received with an invalid command 
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authentication count is considered a defection by an anonymous ground station and the  
I-Trust value for the CTMS member ID is decreased. 
Once the attack sequence reaches the current satellite command authentication 
count, the attackers command is evaluated based upon system security policy.  The trust 
value shown in the diagnostic output for this event is now -0.9996, which is well below 
the policy limit of -0.5, see Figure 22.  The output also shows the policy evaluation, 
which resulted in the command being rejected. 
 
Figure 22 Step 2, Trust Policy Check During Attack 
 
As the interaction trust values for anonymous entities is now below the policy 
limit it can only be restored through the secure unlock command.  This command is 
generated and transmitted to the satellite using the custom commanding tool, see  
Figure 23.  The secure unlock command contains a unique authentication credential as an 
argument in the command data field.  Upon processing this command, the satellite will 
restore the I-Trust values to zero which will re-enable anonymous commanding. 
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Figure 23 Secure Unlock Command Transmission 
 
The third CTMS test step is execution of the secure unlock command.  The 
unlock command is processed to evaluate the authentication credential, which is a more 
authoritative form of trust than the interaction trust value.  The diagnostic output for the 
credential evaluation follows the verification procedure outlined in Section 4.3.2.  This 
unlock command follows the last invalid command sent by the malicious user, which is 
indicated by the error at the top of the diagnostic display, see Figure 24.  The decrypted 
authentication credential is displayed on the diagnostic port followed by the checks 
necessary to validate the credential.  All of the checks are successful in this test which 
results in the I-Trust trust values for the anonymous MemberID being set to zero along 
with the command authentication counter. 
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Figure 24 Step 3, Secure Unlock Command Processing 
 
The final step in this example CTMS test is to transmit legitimate anonymous 
commands to the satellite for processing.  Since the secure unlock command was 
executed, the I-Trust value for anonymous commanding is set to zero.  Since the I-Trust 
value is now greater than the policy limit of -0.5, anonymous commands will be 
processed.  Additionally, the command authentication counter was reset to zero, which 
will allow the legitimate ground station to begin commanding with that count.  The first 
successful legitimate command after the unlock is verified with the diagnostic port output 
shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 Step 4, Legitimate Commanding Following Unlock 
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